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In the SupreDie Court of the
State of Utah

DALE BERKELEY WILSON,
P-laintiff and Respondent,
vs.

OASE
NO. 7968

DR. MERRn.L L. OLDROYD,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACI'S
Respondent's basic objection to appellant's "Statement
of F~ct'' is not that such statement fails to cite the pages
of the record claimed to support it, in violation of Utah
Rules of Civil Prcx:edure 75(p) (2), but that it is confined
largely to conclusions for the purpose of supporting appellant's theory, disregarding the great weight of the testimony
refuting it. Where unfavorable evidence is mentioned the
reference is toned down or glossed over. Far from fairly
surruharizing the actual testimony, counsel have mentioned
carefully selected extracts of ·that part of the record which
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might to some extent have supported their position, had
the jury believed it. As we understand it, the issue before
this Court on conflicting evidence· is whether that evi<;lence
favorable to the plaintiff, which the jury had a right to believe, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom, supports the verdict of the jury. It, therefore,
is considered necessary to make an additional statement.
The parties generally will be designated as .they were
in the lower ·court~ Unless otherwise indicated, references
indicate the pages of the·· transcript.
The plaintiff lives at Payson, where he has lived practically'·an his life (91). He and Geraldine Beck Wilson,
whom he married in 1939, have two children, Becky Deane
and Dianne (92). When he and Geraldine were married,
she was completing her nurse's training in San Francisco.
The plaintiff for the past six years has been employed in
the Veterans On-Farm Training program, set up by the
State Department of Education (92). Prior to that time
he taught school, and theretofore worked for Houghton Mifflin Publishing House in their textbook division (93) .
Plaintiff had known Dr. Merrill Oldroyd about twenty
years~ He was very friendly with him from the time Dr.
Oldroyd first came to Payson. That friendship continued
until the time the ·claimed alienation occurred. Plaintiff
and the doctor also had business transactions (94). He had
also been the Wilsons' family doctor for years. He attended
the birth of one of their children, the plaintiff and his wife
had gone to him for professional services on numerous occasions. ~~ t09k the tonsils out of plaintiff's children. He
operated upon ~he plaintiff for thyroid. He performed a
female operation on the plaintiff's wife in January, 1951
(95).
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3
. ~th plcdntiff and independent witnesses testified to
the marriage relations of plaintiff and his wife, Geraldi~e
Beck Wilson. Plaintiff testified that prior to the rna tters
complained of by plaintiff, he and his wife were very happy.
They enjoyed each other's companionship. They traveled
together and they and their families had close and pleasant
associations in the community. They were very close together (96). He was always in love with his wife. Generally every night they would tell each other of their love,
she being affectionate toward him and he toward her (98).
Close friends of the Wilsons testified as to their harmonious relations up to the time the trouble began with
Dr. Oldroyd, when, not wishing to intrude, they quit seeing
the Wilsons regularly (8 to 31). This was in the fall of
1950 when· plaintiff noticed a change in his wife's attitude
(98-99).

·Along in August or September, 1950, Geraldine Wilson was asked to work at the Payson City Hospital during
the vacation of one of the nurses., and it wasn't long after
that when she told the plaintiff she thought she would stay
on. The question of her staying on was discussed by her
with plaintiff in November and plaintiff wished her to quit
but she decided to stay (97). In the latter part of November or the first part of December, plaintiff noted a definite
change in her in that she was irritable in her home (99).
She and Dr. Oldroyd told him that it was necessary for
Geraldine to be operated upon, and the plaintiff thought
perhaps the irritability of his wife was because of her need
of an operation (99). In December, the plaintiff went to
Dr. Oldroyd and told him his wife was a little irritable with
the children· and him and suggested it was because she was
run down and asked the doctor to get her to quit working
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at the hospital (100). Apparently the doctor's response
was indefinite.
Mrs. Wilson was operated on the 1st or 2nd of January,
·1951 (101). . The morning of the operation, the plaintiff
walked into the room of his wife and the doctor was there
at the side of her bed. He had lipstick smeared on his face.
Mrs. Wilson had been given a hypo, and she turned to Dr.
Oldroyd and said, "0 honey, you like red lips and curley
hair" (102).
About the 3rd or 4th of January, 1951, while Geraldine
was still in the hospital, plaintiff went to Dr Oldroyd's home
and told him that he was interfering with plaintiff's home
and that he'd like to have him stop. Dr. Oldroyd denied
that he had been doing anything as far as Mrs. Wilson was
concerned, and stated to plaintiff, "You have been the best
friend that I have ever had." The plaintiff told him that
he was going to protect his home with everything that he
could and that he didn't want him interfering (103). In
December of 1950 or early in January, 1951, defendant
denied that he was having anything to do with Mrs. Wilson
and said in words and substance, "Why, Dale, you are accusing me wrongfully 'here, and my wife will hear of this,
she is upstairs" (104).
On or about 9:00 o'clock p.m. the 19th day of January,
1951, plaintiff went to Dr. Oldroyd's office and pled with
him to leave his wife alone. Plaintiff then accused Dr. Oldroyd of writing Mrs. Wilson a letter and Dr. Oldroyd denied that he had (106, 107).
Up to this point, while pla~ntiff had been suspicious
of Dr. Oldroyd, he had no definite proof to meet the doctor's denials that there was anything between him arid the
plaintiff's wife (137). While plaintiff testified that it was

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
early in the month of January, 1951, that his wife told him
that she loved Dr. Oldroyd (192), he didn't know fully what
was going on until after he got the letter (plaintiff's Exhibits A and B, 194 and 196). ·Up until that time, Dr~ Oldroyd denied that there was anything between plaintiff's wife
and him, and when plaintiff consulted him about his wife's
attitude, suggested that the situation should be analyzed to
figure out where the trouble was (46, 47).
The letter in question was procured by plaintiff from
the E·ureka post office and was written by Dr. Oldroyd to
plaintiff's wife and mailed at Eureka (108, 109). The night
of January 20th, 1951, plaintiff got an appointment with
Dr. Oldroyd and met him at his office. Mrs. Oldroyd, Dr.
Oldroyd's wife, was present at the conversation with Dr.
Oldroyd. Dr.. Oldroyd again denied he had written any
letter to Geraldine, but when confronted with part of the
contents of the letter, he finally conceded that he had written it (109, 110).
The letter had the return address on the envelope of
H. Ockerman, friend of the Wilsons and Dr. ·Oldroyd (110) ..
Dr. Oldroyd wrote the letter in his own handwriting and
mailed it to Mrs. Wilson in California (112). The letter,
over objection, was received into evidence (114, 116), and
is as follows:

"M. L. OLDROYD, M. D.
150 South First West
Payson, Utah
1-20-51
''Geraldine Sweetheart:-"If ever I need you its tonight. Honey everything

is so confusing to me I am nearly ·crazy. When I saw
you last tonight (sic) it was with a broken heart to see
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you so sad. Honey I just couldn't say good buy (sic)
I thought I would fall over in the snow before I got
back into the office.
"I was so nervous about it all ~ause I t:hot Dale
might have got hold of that letter. But apparently
from the way he acted he hadn't seen it. Geraldine My
Dear right now I am choking back some of those tears
that were mentioned in that letter. I am a little sorry
you had to tear it up because there was so much in it
that might have given you solace.

"Right now honey at 10/30 p.m. You are Probably sailing thru the air. I am so concerned about
you sweetheart. and how I need you right this minute.
Did you know that Dale ·called me on the telephone and
told me I had ruined his home, ruined his life, and it
was all because you are in love with me.

2.
"M. L.

O~LDROYD,

M. D.

150 South First West
Payson, Utah
"Oh! I do need your explanations of these things and
how am I going to get them. Letters are not always
expUcit and complete. But I do want you to write and
explain what happened and why you so suddenly decided to go home. Honey you nearly floored me when
you called and said you were going and that you
couldn't talk.
"I have just come home from Peg's and she tried
to pacify me as best she could bless her heart. And
then I called Eddith and she is all upset. Gerry Dear
you have us all running in circles wondering just what
has happened.
''At 6 P. M. and just after you left Dr. Curtis called
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and a~ked me if I would go over and do an auto~y on
John Gatley. I told him Yes, thinking it might help
me and give me a little outlet. But Honey I could
hardly do it. My Mind was a blank. All I could think
of was you my Dear.
f')

v.

"M. L. OLDROYD, M. D.
150 South First West
Payson, Utah
"Gerry Dear; please forgive me for any pain or
embarrassment I have caused you in this whole affair.
I promise you the pain caused, has hurt me too, and
the pain to me, and the mental agony we are now going
thru is only overshadowed by memory of the time we
have spent together.
"No Matter what has happened and no matter
what sadness the future holds, my deep feeling for you
My Dear will never falter nor waiver.
"Let Me ask You something else sweetheart and
please dont misunderstand Honey. Don't take that
first cigarette. Dont let me lose that battle. I am
asking that of you my Dear for your own good. and
well being. I know that you will be tempted. Don't
suffer the nervousness of quitting for 3 weeks and then
start I'm afraid you will honey, but if you do

4.
"M. L. OLDROYD, M. D.
150 South First West
Payson, Utah
you will hurt Me terribly. Remember Gerry I'm depending on you. I have faith in your word and I am
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sure that your feeling for me is strong enough that you
won't deceive me.
"Deals like this one today nearly kill me and I'm
sure they do you. But remember that the storm has
to come before the calm.
"Write to me often honey. Both Eddith and Peg
will deliver me the letters and not betray our confidence. Tell me everything you do, and ev,ery place you
go, and just wish that I could be with you. Tell me
your father's and Grandmother's reaction to the whole
thing. Oh I am so interested in you, your well being
and our ultimate victory over this potential Boomerang.
"Remember my dear .. all the times I've told you
"I love you". I still do a thousand fold - believe me Write often sweetheart to your humble servant --The
one who cares.
"PAYSON CITY HOSPITAL
Payson, Utah
"Good Morning Honey: .. You will please pardon me
for such a wrinkled messed up letter, but just as I finished it and proof reading it she came down stairs and
wanted to know who I was writing to and I told her
you and so help me I thot she was going to take it away
from me-- We fought and battled all night long. Talked
diverce proceedings, kids, settlement, etc. You know
what you have gone thru. Well, I'm going thru it last
night and again this morning. Its hard to tell you all
about it in a letter. but honey I'll keep you posted as
best I ·can. I was going to have sent you a telegram
at 1 A. M. but at that time the battle was raging. I do
hope You had a nice pleasant trip, without too much
depression & tiring. How are your folks? My regards
to them-----
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"Sweetheart:-- for our protection we had best read
each others letters and then destroy them. I am so
lonesome to see you. I was going to the desert this
morning--but I am too upset. However I may go this
afternoon. Write Often honey but be sure and not send
the letters directly to me --- Bye now. I love you"
(envelope)
"H. Ockerman
195 N. 3rd E.
Payson, Utah
"Mrs. Geraldine Wilson
c/o Dr. J. Karl Beck
5621 Grand Ave
Riverside, Cal."
(Plaintiff's Exhibits A and B)
The reason defendant put the return address on the
letter was because he wanted the letter, if it were not delivered to Mrs. Wilson, to be returned to Mrs. Ockerman
and not to his wife (68) .
Even after this, plaintiff pled with Dr. Oldroyd to get
him to leave Mrs. Wilson alone (118). Dale said to him
the day after receiving the letter, "Doctor, if you will go
back to your wife, and write my wife to that effect now
that she is in California, that you have decided that this is
~ a nnstake, and that you and your wife are going back
together, I know that she will come back to me, bring the
kiddies and everything will be fine" (119, 120). Mrs. Wilson carne back to Utah about January 26th to 28th, 1951,
and upon her arrival plaintiff discussed the letter (plaintiff's Exhibits A and B) with Mrs. Wilson (121). On January 31st, 1951, Mrs. Wilson met Dr. Oldroyd in his office.
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This meeting between them was ostensibly for the purpose
of dis-continuing their relationship (123), but it is obvious
that it didn't turn out this way. It lasted for about three
hours (123). When the meeting was over, Dr. Oldroyd had
lipstick all over his face (123, 124), and had been observed
by Mrs. Oldroyd with Mrs. Wilson sitting on Dr. Oldroyd's
lap; they were embracing and kissing each other (556, 557).
The relationship between Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson did
not stop at the meeting of January 31st, 1951 (125). There
were meetings in Salt Lake City (50 to 56, 125, 126, 422,
423, 426); there was a week-end in Las Vegas, Nevada
(56 to 60, 417, 418, 419') and there was continued correspondence between Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson (60, 61,
125).
The difference from then on was that there was no
pretense thereafter that a love affair had not been going
on ,but it was apparent that Dr. Oldroyd had developed a
.plan whereby he thought he could protect himself from any
responsibility, and yet continue his relationship with Geraldine Beck Wilson until such time as she ·could get a divorce from Dale. He continued to visit with her, but made
it a point to have such visits ·while "witnesses" were in the
general vicinity, even though these "witnesses" were a close
personal friend, who was a married man, and a single woman
not his wife who was a friend of the married man (50 to
59). He made it clear to his own Wife (and the fair inference is that he held out the same idea to Mrs. Wilson) that
while he would like to do something financially for the latter, he could not do so as long as she was Dale's wife (544,
545). He carried on love correspondence with Mrs. Wilson while she was out of the state and correspondence from
her was generally sent by pre-arrangement in a sealed en-
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in care of Dr. Oldroyd's personal attorney ~404, 405)
to be delivered to Dr. Oldroyd, or in care of other friends;
and the understanding was had between Mrs. Wilson and
himself that the correspondence would be, and was, destroyed (61-62). Defendant also wanted his correspondence
destroyed so that Dale wouldn't know he was making love
to MrS. Wilson (526, 527).

Dr. Oldroyd even rented a post office box in Provo, although his home and office were in Payson (61), presumably so that his correspondence with Mrs. Wilson could be
carried on with less likelihood of his wife's finding out (61).
Finally, to complete this design for alienation without responsibility, he corresponded with Mrs. Wilson prior to her
action for divorce against the plaintiff (407) (which Mrs.
Wilson brought after informing Dale that if he didn't sue
for a diverce, she would), and his attorneys conferred with
her (436), and prior to the alienation suit, they all conferred
together (426, 436).
The defendant states that evidence of the relationship
of Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson comes entirely from them.
It is apparent that any information obtained from them was
obtained only because their relations could not be denied
in view of the letter which fell into plaintiff's hands, and
because by investigation by both defendant's wife, as well
as plaintiff, irrefutable facts were developed which could
not be avoided. Any information on 'Which plaintiff did
not have proof was avoided by both Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs.
Wilson, and a reading of their testimony on any point concerning their relations which could not otherwise be established by positive testimony will show that it was contradictory, evasive and ambiguous. (See Dr. Oldroyds' testimony 36-74, 511- 527; particularly 511 to 514, 522, 523 to
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527., and Mrs. Wilson's testimony 359 to 456 and particularly 367, 369, 377, 378, 406, 409, 412, 423, 444, 451, etc).
It is blandly asserted on page 5 of defendant's brief that
"there is no evidence in the record or even an intimation
from the defendant that there was any immoral conduct."
We do not agree with this statement. We have not pressed,
and do not now intend to belabor the point, but will let the
record speak for itself.

Often there may be inferences probably drawn from
what witnesses do not say as well as from what they do say.
For example, on another matter, as pointed out above, Dr.
Oldroyd had indicated that he couldn't do anything for Mrs.
Wilson "as long as she was Dale's wife." When Mrs. Wilson was asked about the discussion of financial matters between them, she said:
Q. "Now, Mrs. Wilson, have you mentioned to
him (Dr. Oldroyd) about the possibility of him furnishing money to purchase you a house, haven't you?'A. I don't remember.
Q. Do you deny that you have?
A. I said, I don't remember of asking him.
Q. Would you remember if you had asked him?
A. I don't know whether I would or not." (370)
Dr. Oldroyd's deposition was received in evidence over
his objection. In it, among other things, he stated that the
first time he told Mrs. Wilson he loved her was on December 7th, 1950 (40). .A!bout that time, he took her riding
out to the Keigley Quarry near the mountains west of Payson and when he brought her back, he kissed her and told
-her he loved her; he didn't know whether he had kissed
her the night before when he had taken Mrs. Wilson from
the hospital to the Ockermans (41); again he testified that
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the first time he kissed her was in the latter part of November, 1950 (41). He didn't remember how many occasions he had kissed her (42) and he stated evasively that the
number of times he had told her he loved her ·would be as
indefinite as the number of times he had kissed her (42-43).

Dr. Oldroyd met Mrs. Wilson in May of 1951 at the
Ambassador Club or at Mrs. Fields' home. Together were
one Greer, a married man, a Mrs. Fields (not the wife of
Mr. Greer), Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson (50). Mrs. Wilson had written Dr. Oldroyd that she was coming to Utah.
to file suit for a divorce against Dale, that Dale had agreed
to file, but hadn't and that she'd ''like to talk this thing
over" with Dr. Oldroyd, or something to that effect (53).
Dr. Oldroyd was with Mrs. Wilson four or five hours on
this occasion (54) .
Dr. Oldroyd admitted, as plaintiff had testified, that
plaintiff talked to him about some trouble he was having
with his wife (72). This, the defendant thought, was in the
latter part of November, 1950. The defendant said there
was a gap growing in his own household; this gap had been
growing· for five or ten years, he said (71-72). That, the
defendant stated, was the first time he knew about any
trouble from Dale, but Mrs. Wilson had told him that they
were having a little difficulty ~before that, at about the time
she came back from California in 1950. She didn't say in
words that they were having trouble, but she said that they
were going to have to move over into the big house, and
that she had to have an aunt live with her, and then the next
indication of anything ~between them that wasn't right was
when Dale talked to him (73).
On one other occasion in 1950, he told Mrs. Wilson he
was going down to Zion's Canyon and pick up his daughter
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and Mrs. Wilson wanted to go with him until she found out
that his wife was going and then she said, "Count me out."
(74).
Q. "Those were the only two incidents then, prior
to the time that Dale talked to you, that you had any
idea that there might··.have been· anything wrong between Geraldine and Dale, if there were?
A. That's right.
Q. An~ the time· you talked to Dale may have
been, as you·testify, after the 6th or 7th of December,
.
is that true?
A.· I rattier think it was the latter part of November.
Q. But you don't remember for sure?
A. But I don't remember for sure." (75)

If the defendant, as elose to Mrs. Wilson as he had been,
did not know of any trouble between her and her husband
ather than as indicated, it seems fair to infer any real trouble between plaintiff and his wife arose after such interference which started in November, 1950, or before.
Dr. Oldroyd owns 2,700 head of sheep; that are all paid
for. He testified under oath that they are worth $35 per
head, but later struck out this figure in his deposition and
put in $30 (82). At $30 per head they would be worth a
total of $81,000. He has 50 head of cattle (83) . He has
4,500 acres of grazing land covered by deed. In addition,
he has a winter grazing permit for 3,000 head of sheep and
a summer grazing permit for 2.,695 head of sheep. He has
Government bonds of $8,000 to $10,000. He has 1,000
shares of stock in the Commercial Bank of Utah, which he
testified had a par value of $30 per share, which he later
changed by interlineation in his deposition to $12.50 (84).
Whether the par was only $12.50 or not, the jury could
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well have found in accordance with his .original testimony
that it \Vas worth $30 a share, or a total of $30,000. He
has 180 acres of pasture land near Payson. He has a home
in Payson (85). He has secured real property loans owing
to him of about $30,000 (86). He has a checking account
of $2,000. He has accounts receivable in his medical profession of from $30,000 to $35,000. He has two automobiles,
farm equipment and five or six saddle horses (87, 88).
It thus appears that by Dr. Oldroyd's own original valuations, he has property worth approximately $194,000,
and in addition the following property upon which 'he did
not place a value: 50 head of cattle, 4,500 acres of grazing
land of which he had a deeded title, a winter permit for
grazing 3,000 head of sheep and a summer permit for 2,69'5
sheep, 180 acres of pasture land near Payson, two automobiles, farm equipment, saddle horses and a home. Considering the latter property as of minimum value~ it seems
fair to say that the defendant is worth well over a quarter
of a million dollars.
The· testimony of Dr. Oldroyd about purchase of a
home by Mrs. Wilson is most interesting (590, 591, 592):
"Has she ever written you and mentioned the
purchase of a home?
A. Yes.
Q. And has she ever mentioned the problem of
payment on it, directly or indirectly?
MR. WORTHEN: Object to that as indefinite,
Your Honor, in addition to the other objections, and
duplications, has she ever mentioned the problem of
payment, what does he mean?
THE CO·URT: The objection is overruled.
A. May I explain?
Q.
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Q. You may answer whether she has or not ever
mentioned the problem of payment.
A. You mean of my paying for it? Is that what
you mean?
MR. WORTHEN: Now, we object, if he is inquiring if anybody else paid, because it is certainly outside in this case.
MR. SHERMAN CHRISTE:NSON: It is cross examination.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled.
A. I don't know exactly what you mean. Do
you mean as to whether I should pay for a payment on
the home, or whether someone else----Q. Has she written on the subject of payment at
all?
A. For me to make the payment on her home?
THE OOURT: Do you understand the question?
A. No I don't.
THE OOURT: Think it over.
A. Well, maybe he can ask it in a question that
I can understand it. I may be a little thick, but---MR. WO·RTHEN: Well, don't make any admissions, doctor.
MR. SHERJMAN CHRISTENSON: Would you
read him the question.
Q. Is there anything uncertain about that, doctor, that you don't understand?
A. I ·can't answer you the question in yes or no.
There is quite a lot of ----Q.. If you cantt answer that, doctor, we will pass
to something else.
A. OK. Because I don't know what you mean.
She wrote a letter to me about buying a home, if that
is----Q.

Now, doctor, didn't you state to your wife, in
substance or effect, that you would like to do some-
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thing for Geraldine but you couldn't as long as Geraldine was Dale Wilson's wife?
MR. WORTHEN: May our objection go to this?
THE COURT:
Yes.
A. I might have done. I don't remember any
specific occasion. I have said a lot of times I felt sorry
for Geraldine.
Q. Now, when was the first time that you said
you would like t o do something for Geraldine, but you
couldn't as long as Geraldine was Dale Wilson's wifeMR. WORTHEN: Just a moment, that presupposes something that is not in the record, and a misstatement of the witness' testimony, and on the grounds
otherwise stated we object to it.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled.
A. I ·couldn't tell you when that time was. I
haven't the slightest recollection.
Q. Was that after November, 1950?
A. That I said I would like to help her?
Q. Yes, you couldn't as long as she was Dale Wilson't wife?
A. I assume that it was. I don't remember the
time, though. But I assume it was after November,
1950.
Q. Now, you indicated that you told your wife
that; and was it on more than one occasion that you
told your wife that?
A. I just got through testifying that I couldn't
remember any time ----,.
Q. Was it this year that you toJd her that? This
year?
A. I might have done. I don't remember."
There would seem to be here, despite the evasion, the
most clear financial inducement held out by defendant for
the breakup of plaintiff's home.
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Mrs. Geraldine Beck Wilson was a most willing witness
for the defendant and when permitted, frequently argued
for him by volunteer statement. Her thesis was that due
to the fact that she did not have the conveniences she desired, did not have a nice home and because of various complaints against her husband, she did not love him at the time
she began her close association with Dr. Oldroyd, but other
witnesses demonstrated the unfounded basis of her complaints (11, 12, 16, 17, 25, 27, 28), and the pictures of her
house as received in evidence certainly indicate no cause
for complaint (Plaintiff's Exhibits C to G, inclusive). She
admitted that she told no one of any claimed difficulty with
Dale prior to her close association with Dr. Oldroyd, except
her father, who was a friend and fellow doctor of defendant (437) . Her testimony as to her claims was directly
contradicted by plaintiff ( 97, 617, 618, 619).
It is interesting to note that both the defendant and
Mrs. Wilson testified several times during the trial that the
defendant urged Mrs. Wilson to stay with her husband, the
plaintiff; but certainly the actions of the defendant very
much belied his words, unless he merely wished to have her
around for him to make love to while she was living under
the same roof with the plaintiff.
Any alleged force used by Mr. Wilson, the plaintiff,
upon his wife, Mrs. Wilson, was after the associations of
Dr. Oldroyd with Mrs. Wilson were known, and upon a dare
by Mrs. Wilson (342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 441).
Defendant at the trial and in his brief makes great
point of the claim (397) that after January 1st, 1951, he
was not alone with Mrs. Wilson, except for one occasion.
The evidence shows that after that time he had written endearing letters to Mrs. Wilson in which he had asked her to
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destroy certain letters (60, 61, 62, 541, 558, 559) ; had me~
her in Las Vegas in company with another married roan
and a \voman not such married man's wife, and stayed a
weekend at the same hotel Mrs. Wilson stayed at without
the knowledge of defendant's wife (56, 57, 58, 59, 661, 662,
664, 665, 666) ; had called her on the telephone on different
occasions and expressed his affection for her (61); and yet
the defendant and defendant's counsel seem to feel that everything was entirely all right if the defendant did not see
Mrs. Wilson "alone."
For the facts concerning the Las Vegas weekend, we
are not compelled to rely entirely on the testimony of the
defendant and Mrs. Wilson, whi·ch, itself, made such trip
unexplainable on any proper basis, but we may also have
recourse to certain reasonable inferences flowing, among
other things, from the fact that Greer and Betty Fields,
close friends of the defendant, were on the same trip, were
available to the defendant at the trial, and were not called
by the defendant -concerning this trip, Betty Fields not being called at all, although she was in Provo at the time of
the trial and Greer being called by the defendant for a few
questions on an entirely different matter (564-567). Moreover, the defendant concealed the trip from his own wife,
driving clear up to Sun Valley, Idaho, from Las Vegas, Nevada, presumably right through Payson, where his wife
was, and calling his wife only from Sun Valley, apparently
to lead her to think he had been there and not at Las Vegas
(661, 662).
When Dale in a telephone conversation with Geraldine's
father indicated he was at fault (355), the facts justify not
the inference defendant seeks to draw, for it was clear that
the trouble was not Dale's fault, but only that even as late
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as March 17th, 1951, Dale still had great affection for his
wife, taking blame for the situation that had arisen from
the defendant's interference, and was still trying desperately
to save his marriage.
All through the testimony of Mrs. Wilson, there may
be noted a compelling desire to say anything which might
be favorable to the defendant, even when objections were
being made. It was obvious that the alienation of her affections from her former husband had been accomplished
thoroughly and completely.
On cross examination, Mrs. Wilson was forced to admit that she had affection for Dr. Oldroyd in January of
1951 (359), in December of 1950 (359) and that she had
admiration for him in November of 1950 (359); that she
liked him in November and December of 1950 (360) and
that her affection grew from November, 1950 to December,
1950; that she liked him more in November, 1950, than in
1941 (361); that she didn't know whether she liked him
better in November than he liked him in the preceding year,
in 1949 (362). She also admitted on cross examination that
she had kissed Dr. Oldroyd on different occasions and that
Dr. Oldroyd had kissed her. She didn't know how many
times (363). She testified on cross examination that she
first kissed Dr. Oldroyd in December of 1950, and that Dr.
Old~oyd kissed her in December of 1950 (363, 364); that
on one occasion when Dr. Oldroyd kissed her they were
parked out at Keigley Quarry near the west mountains west
of Payson (364). All of this occurred when the doctor
knew she was married to the plaintiff (365). She admitted
on cross examination that Dr. Oldroyd had kissed her on
another occasion when he had driven her to a club meeting
within a night or two of the Keigley Quarry episode (365).
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Mrs. Wilson further admitted on cross examination
that she loved Dr. Ol~royd in December, 1950 (367). She
admitted that Dr. Oldroyd was nice to her (367); she testified that she didn't remember when the defendant first
wrote and told her that he loved her (368), but admitted
that when the doctor had written to her he told her to detroy his letters to her (369) and that the defendant may
have said that he would destroy her letters to him (369);
and that she did destroy all of Dr. Oldroyd's letters to her
(405-406).
lVfrs. Wilson on cross examination testified that iDr.
Oldroyd met her in Salt Lake City in June, 1951, when she
flew to Salt Lake City; that this occasion was before the
Las Vegas trip, and that she kissed Dr. ,Oldroyd good-bye
on that occasion (423) . Mrs. Wilson admitted that it may
have been in May of 1951 when she stayed the first time
overnight with Betty Fields (who came with Dr. Oldroyd
and Mr. Greer when they met Mr. Wilson in Las Vegas)
(424).
~Irs. Wilson admitted on cross examination that when
plaintiff had an operation in 1949, she sobbed and cried, but
stated it was because she was worn out (433, 434).
She admitted on cross examination that he couldn't
remember whether she had mentioned to anyone other than
her father and Dale that she was unhappy prior to November, 1950, but then admitted she testified upon a deposition
that she said nothing to anyone else before that time (427).
She testified that she didn't know how long she had
been in love with Dr. Oldroyd at the time Mr. Wilson, plaintiff, spanked her ( 441). She told plaintiff to go ahead and
spank her (44~). Mrs. Wilson testified on cross examination that it was during the time Dr. Oldroyd was telling her
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that he loved her and was kissing her that she claimed he
encouraged her to stay with Dale (444).
Mrs. Wilson testified that she told Dale after she had
fallen in love with Dr. Oldroyd that if he didn't get a divorce, she would (445). She testified on cross examination
as follows (449) :

"But you continued to live with him as a wife
until you fell in love with Dr. Oldroyd, didn't you?
MR. WORTHEN: I object to that, Your Honor,
as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, not proper
cross examination. Duplicitous.
THE ·COURT: Were you finished?
MR. WORTHEN: Presuming, assuming something not in the record.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled.
Q. That is a fact, isn't it Mrs. Wilson?
A. That I continued to live with him as his wife?
Q. Yes, until you fell in love with Dr. Oldroyd?
A. I lived with him as his housekeeper.
Q. You say you didn't live with him as a wife?
A. I didn't ----Q. Did you sleep with him after that?
A. In August.
Q. Yes.
A. For a few weeks, yes.
Q. And in a few weeks you had fallen in love with
Dr. Oldroyd, hadn't you?
MR. W,O,RTHEN: Object to that as incompetent,
irrelevant and immaterial, Your Honor, not proper recross and repetition.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled.
Q. That is right, isn't it?
A. I said I didn't know when I fell in love with
Dr. Oldroyd.''
Q.
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Plaintiff testified that he and his wife ceased sleeping
together in March, 1951· (187).
Mrs. Wilson testified that she hadn't seen Dr. Oldroyd
alone since January 31st, 1951, but that she had seen him
in company with Mrs. Fields, Mr. Greer and Mrs. Fields'
daughter (451). She was asked the following question and
gave the following answer (451):
"Have you made it a point to have those people with you when you have associated with Dr. Oldroyd, or has it just happened?
A. I don't know as it is a point or not. I don't
remember of ever making it a point when I have seen
him in company with anyone else. I have had no reason to see him with anyone else."
Q.

She admitted that she was alone with Dr. ~Oldroyd in
February, 1951, but stated that she had forgotten (453).
Mrs. Wilson admitted that in February of 1951, Mr.
Wilson was trying to get Dr. Oldroyd to leave her alone
(455); she didn't know whether she and plaintiff had been
quarreling about her love for the defendant (455, 456).
Helen McNabb was called as a witness for the defendant and testified that she knew Mrs. Wilson since 1940. In
an effort to show that Mr. Wilson's conduct toward Mrs.
Wilson was cold, she testified that in 1940 there were several couples that went to Payson Canyon on a party and
members of the group were necking and acting silly and
that plaintiff didn't neck in public with his wife ( 462). She
thought it was unusual that Dale Wilson wasn't loving up
his wife while other couples were around ( 479). Mrs. McNabb was married when she was fifteen (479). Mrs. McNabb, on cross examination, admitted that on many occasions she saw Mrs. Wilson show affection for plaintiff (483).
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She testified that about ten years ago when her husband
and Dale went pheasant hunting, Mrs. Wilson had to get
up and make the fire but she didn't remember whether her
husband and Dale got up early, built a fire and cooked their
breakfast and left Mrs. Wilson in bed. She didn't know
when the pheasant hunt started then-whether morning or
noon (485). Mr. Wilson testified that he and Mr. McNabb
went hunting early in the morning, made the fire, cooked
breakfast and left early, about 6 :30 in the morning. The
season opened early in the morning that year (621).
Mrs. McNabb came all the way from Portland by arrangement with the defendant to give her testimony, and
the few trivial troubles that she had ever observed bespoke
well for the married happiness of the plaintiff and his wife
over the years.
Mrs. Lola Oldroyd, wife of the defendant, was called
by the defendant and an unsuccessful effort was made by
him to limit her testimony to defendant's counterclaim; a
fine woman, apparently tom between an effort to try to
please the defendant in an effort to salvage her own marriage and her duty to testify as a witness, she reluctantly
testified on ·cross examination that on or about February
7th, 1952, after this case had been filed, as far as she knew
her husband, the defendant, and Mrs. Wilson were corresponding at that time and that she knew they were talking
on the telephone (530, 531); that she had given a great deal
of thought to efforts to break up the romance between Dr.
Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson (533). She further stated on cross
examination that on February 7th, 1952, the romance between Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson was going on and had
been up to the time of the trial herein (534, 535). There
was nothing to indicate that the relations between Mrs. Wil-
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son and Dr. Oldroyd were any different in February, 1952,
than they had been in August, 1951. Her ideas about the
relations between ~Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson were the
same in August, 1951 as they were in February of 1952
(536).

Mrs. Oldroyd in answer to questions on cross examination as to whether she ·had told Mr. Wilson, plaintiff's father,
that Dr. Oldroyd had given her some instructions with respect to some proceeds of an insurance poHcy for Mrs. Wilson, she testified as follows (543, 544, 545) :

A. "I may state here, that in regards to this question, the doctor has told me, not only once, but many
times, that he felt sorry for Mrs. Wilson because she
was so unhappy, and he said, 'I would like to help her
but I can't help her, I ·can't help her as long as she is
a married woman.'
Q. I see. And did he tell you in that connection
that he would wait until she was a single woman to help
her?
A. He didn't tell me anything definite. He said,
'I would like to help her but I can't'.
Q. As long as she is a married woman, is that
right?
A. In fact, the exact words ----Q. Now, just answer.
A. -----was, 'As long as she is married to Dale I
·can't help her.'
·
Q. . I think you mentioned so that it shows in the
record that you made no statement concerning what
Dr. Oldroyd told you about $50,000, to Mr. Wilson, there
was no mention of that, is that right?
A. I don't remember of mentioning any amount
of money to Mr. Wilson or Dr. Oldroyd had never mentioned $50,000 to me.
Q. Has he mentioned any other particular sum?
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A. The only thing he has ever said ----Q. Pardon me, you said the only thing that he
said----A. He has said, 'I would like to help her because
she is so unhappy; but under the ·circumstances I can't.'
Q. As long as she is Dale's wife, is that correct?
A. We discussed it several tlmes; I was vecy suspicious and I asked him. And that was his answer every time, 'I ·can't help her. I would like to but I con't.' "
Mrs. Oldroyd further testified on cross examination
as follow.s (553, 554):
Q. "Now, let me ask you this, Mrs. Oldroyd, did you
also tell Mr. Wilson, Dale's father, on that occasion
that when Geraldine came back from Los Angeles, Dr.
Oldroyd told you that he did not want to be disturbed
while she was there and asked you to care for Mark,
and see that he did not ·come downstairs? (Mark is
the young son of Dr. and Mrs. Oldroyd) *
A. Yes..
Q. You told him that?
A. Yes. I asked him----Q. iDid you also tell that you got suspicious and
took Mark up to Santaquin and left him with a friend
of yours?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you also tell Mr. O~droyd (sic) on that
~asi<>n-----

MR. WORTHEN: Who?
Q. Or Mr. Wilson, Dale's father, that you went
up, you selected a dark place in the hall where you
c<>uld both hear and see, when you g<>t back after taking your son up to Santaquin?
A. I told him that I made it a point to be in the
house where I could see and hear."

(*Parentheses ours)
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Mrs. Oldroyd testified further on cross examination
that she saw Mrs. Wilson sit on Dr. Oldroyd's lap (556) and
saw Mrs. Wilson kiss Dr. Oldroyd while sitting on his lap
(557).
She further testified on cross examination as follows
(562, 563):
"Did you not also tell Mr. Dale Wilson, either
in May or June, 1951, that Dr. Oldroyd had asked for
a divorce, hut that he had ruined your life and that
you didn't propose to give him a divorce?
A. Dr. Oldroyd has never asked me for a divorce.
Q. . I am asking you, Mrs. Oldroyd ----A. I didn't tell Dale he had asked me for a divorce. Mr. Wilson asked me if he was getting a di. .
vorce and I said, 'Not that I know of', in his ·conversation in May.
Q. Did you also add that he had ruined your life,
and that you didn't propose to give him a divorce until
your son, your youngest son, had reached his majority?
A. Something to that effect, I wouldn't say they
were the same words.''
Q.

Her words, according to the testimony of plaintiff,
were, "Frankly, he has ruined my life and I am not going
to give him a divorce and let him ruin anyone else's, and
until our boy, Mark, who is five years old, becomes of age,
he will have a hard time getting a divorce" (623).
Mrs. Oldroyd, on cross examination, testified that at
the time of the doctor's trip to Las Vegas, when he met Mrs.
Wilson, he called Mrs. Oldroyd from Sun Vlalley on Monday evening about 7 o'clock (661, 662). It was the day
following the time she had a telephone conversation with
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her sister in Las Vegas. She had told Mrs. Oldroyd that
Dr. Oldroyd had just left Las Vegas (662), and she further
testified that he didn't call her home on his way from Las
Vegas to Sun Valley (662). As far as Dr. Oldroyd's conversation from Sun Valley, that was where his trip had
been. He didn't mention a word that he had been to Las
Vegas (665). The first time that Mrs. Oldroyd knew that
Geraldine Wilson was in Las Vegas with Dr. Oldroyd was
when Dale told Mrs. Oldroyd (667).
The defendant had called his wife, Mrs. Oldroyd, in an
attempt to establish on his counterclaim for slander that
her suspicions had been aroused by plaintiff's statements
to her, but her cross examination established that her suspicions of her husband were really more than suspicion, as
the result of first-hand knowledge from her own investigation.
She denied on cross examination that she had made
some statements attributed to her, but on impeachment,
.Melvin Wilson testified that he talked to Mrs. Oldroyd on
or about August 5th, 1951, in front of his home at the request of Mrs. Oldroyd (595, 596), when Geraldine had come
from Los Angeles; that Mrs. Oldroyd told him that she saw
Dr. Oldroyd and Geraldine hugging and kissing (600, 601);
that she heard them planning their future (601). That she
stood in the hall for about an hour and a half and then
grew disgusted (602). That she would accuse him of writing to Geraldine and then hear him lie out of it (602) ; that
Geraldine had asked him for money to ·buy a house, when
she could not find one, but he told her it was too risky for
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both of them until she got a divorce (602, 603). That when
Dr. Oldroyd was sick, he wanted Mrs. Oldroyd to promise
that she would give the one insurance policy to Geraldine
if anything happened to him (603, 604, 605). That Dr. Old-

royd had told Mrs. Oldroyd that Mrs. Wilson would make
a queen in his (Oldroyd's) home (605); that Dr. ~Oldroyd

had asked Mrs. Oldroyd what she would take to release
him and that she had told him it would take every dollar
he O\vned and Dr. Oldroyd had said, "Well, it might be
worth it" ( 605) .
Various statements relied upon and emphasized in defendant's brief and claimed to have been made by plaintiff
concerning his attitude toward his. wife, or to the effect that
the trouble was his fault or concerning his financial interest
in the case, or his attorneys' fees, or about his objections
to Mrs. Wilson's association with another doctor, or the
value he placed on his wife, or his motives in bringing this
suit and other similar matters, and various claims with respect to the conditions under which the Wilsons lived and
concerning other women, by which defendant attempts to
create prejudice against the plaintiff, were specifically denied by plaintiff or fully explained to the extent that they
were not obviously groundless (192, 202, 203, 210, 211, 213,
214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 236, 237, 238, 239, 244, 245,
617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 634). The jury had the right to
pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and resolve conflicts in their testimony, and it would be unduly extending
this Statement of Facts to quote in full the evidence disregarded by defendant.
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Point I. The court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint and defendant's motion for a more definite statement or in admitting testimony over defendant's objection that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action.

The complaint reads:
(Title of court and cause)
"Plaintiff complains of the defendant and for cause of
action alleges:
"1. That plaintiff and Geraldine Beck Wilson were
lawfully married in Reno, Nevada, on or about June
4th, 1H39.
"2. That plaintiff and said Geraldine Beck Wilson
lived together happily as husband and wife with two
children born to them until the affections of said Geraldine Beck Wilson, plaintiff's wife, were alienated by
the defendant as hereinafter set forth.
"3. That during the period October 15th, 1950 to October 24th, 1951, the said defendant, well ·knowing
that the said Geraldine Beck Wilson :was the wife of
plaintiff, wrongfully, wilfully and maUciously alienated
the affections of said Geraldine Beck Wilson from the
plaintiff.
"4. As a direct result of defendant's actions in alienating the affections of said Geraldine Beck Wilson from
plaintiff, said plaintiff has been and is wrongfully deprived by defendant of the comfort, society and aid of
the said Geraldine Beck Wilson, and of the children
of said Geraldine Beck Wilson and plaintiff, all to plaintiff's damage in the sum of $75,000.00.
"5. That the acts of the defendant in alienating the
affections of plaintiff's wife were malicious, and were
done in wanton disregard of the rights, feelings and
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reputation of the plaintiff, and the reputation -of his
family and by reason thereof, plaintiff demands exemplary and punitive damages against the defendant in the
sum of $25,000.00.
"\VHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment from the
defendant as follows:

"1.

For the sum of $75,000.00 compensatory damages.

"2.

For the sum of $25,000.00 punitive damages.

"3. For costs of court.
For such other and further relief as to the court
may seem proper.''
H4.

The action was filed after the effective date of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, to-wit: on November 9th, 1951.
Defendant's argument under this point is confined largely to fragmentary references to old cases.
In no case cited by defendant is the complaint held not
to state a cause of action. In all but the last case cited by
him, the demurrers were held properly overruled and in the
last case the demurrer was held to be eroneously sustained
and the trial court was reversed on that ground. All of the
cases cited were under the old practice.
On the other hand, our Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
simply provide that a pleading which sets forth a claim
for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. (Rule 8(a))
The examples given in the rules (appendix) are consistent with the pleading in this case. The marriage, the
existence of a happy relation, the wrongful alienation of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32
the affections of plaintiff's wife, and the resulting deprivation by defendant of her comfort, society and aid, with resulting damage to plaintiff, all appear. That the defendant aliena ted the affections of the wife is an ultimate fact,
the means claimed being details which the plaintiff could
and did obtain by the discovery processes provided by the
rules and other available means.
We refer to some of the cases cited by defendant on
the question of pleading to show their inapplicability on this
point, and because of the background they may furnish as
to other points.
Buckley v. Francis~ 78 Utah 606, 6 P.2d 188, is cited on
page 14 of appellant's brief in support of the argument that
the allegations of the complain11 were insufficient. This
case does not turn on any question of pleading. The opinion recited that, "This action is founded upon a complaint
wherein plaintiff alleged that his wife's affections for him
were wrongfully and unlawfully alienated by defendant to
plaintiff's damage in the sum of $10,000.00 for which amount
plaintiff prayed judgment against the defendant." A reference to the complaint as shown in the abstract of the
record in that case will indicate that the Supreme Court's
language is a fair summary of the ultimate facts alleged,
omitting only matters of inducement, emphasis and detail.
Monson v. Solace (Mont) 212 Pac. 1103, cited on page
14 of appellant's brief alleged the means by which the alienation was accomplished, but the Supreme Court of Montana in upholding the sufficiency of the complaint had this

to say:
". . . . In such an action the complaint should
set forth the marriage relation and the loss by the
plaintiff of the person, affection, society and aid of his
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or her wife or husband, and that the same was accom ..
plished by the intentional, wrongful or malicious conduct of the defendant. We are of the opinion that
reansonably construed the First Cause of Action states
all of these ultimate facts."
Certainly such ultimate facts are also stated in plaintiff's complaint here, to an extent probably sufficient under the old rules, and fully in keeping with the spirit, letter
and example of the new rules. As indicated, the defendant
had full opportunity for information as to details of evidence through transcripts of the divorce proceedings, and
through depositions prior to the trial, and he can make no
claim that he was misled or prejudiced through ignorance
of the detailed basis of the plaintiff's cause of action.
Williams v. Williams (Colo) 37 Pac. 614, was decided
in 1894 and manifestly before Colorado adopted its Rules
of Civil Procedure patterned after the Federal rules. This
case, contrary to the inference contained in appellant's
brief, holds expressly that in an action for enticing away
a wife, it is sufficient to allege in the cmplaint the ultimate
facts without a statement of the arts made use of to accomplish the alleged purpose (p. 616) . It is true that somewhat more detail of the a~ resorted to is alleged than appears in the complaint in the instant ·case, but even under
the old practice it is inferred that these additional details
are unnecessary, and the earlier case of French v. ·'Deane,
36 Pac. 609, is quoted with approval on this point.
The same conclusion is reached in White v. White (Kan)
90 Pac. 1087. Syllabus 2 of that case summarizes the rule
as follows:
"In an action by a wife for the alienation of the affec-

tions. of her husband, a statement in the petition of the
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ultimate facts of the alienation and separation is enough
without pleading the acts done and artifices used to ac..
complish the result."
Gvirtz v. Leiser, et ux (Colo) 58 P.2d 481, cited pp. 1415 in appellant' :brief on the same point, was likewise decided
long prior to the adoption by Colorado of its new Rules of
Civil Procedure, and yet the complaint involved under the
old practice there was sustained.
The quotation appearing in appellant's brief from Nich·
ols v. 'Nichols (Mo.) 35 SW 577, indicates that even under
the old practice allegations such as are contained in the
complaint in the case at bar should be sufficient. The rule
announced there is to the effect that a petition alleging that
defendant wrongfully enticed, influenced and induced plaintiff's husband to abandon her and to live separate and apart
from her thereby depriving, and intending to deprive, her
of his affection, comfort, society and support, states a cause
of action. In that case the sustaining of a demurrer by the
trial court was held error.
The complaint stated a claim for alienation of affection; defendant had available to him all of the effective instruments of discovery under the new rules (Rules 26 to 37)
as well as details from the divorce action. His motion to
dismiss, and motion for a more definite statement were
properly overruled, his objection to the introduction of evidence was properly denied, and no possible error or prejudice in such rulings is indicated.
Point D. The verdict was not excessive· and was not
under the influence of passion or pr~judice.

giv~n

Granted that the amount of the judgment is substantial and finds few precedents in this state, yet the combin-
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ation. of facts as shown by the record indicating the right

to damages, both compensatory and punitive, and the persistency, adroitness and aggravated nature of defendant's
design in view of the relations of the parties, have few, if
any, precedents, either.
The amount of damages awarded is a matter peculiarly
within the province of the jury. Mere amount of a verdict,
however great, does not of itself indicate passion or prejudice. There is nothing in the record to show anything but
considered, patient, justifiable action on the part of both
the trial judge and the jury, despite the attacks and innuendos of the defendant. Really, what the defendant is complaining of is that both the judge and jury did not adopt his
theory and put their stamp of approval on defendant's ·conduct, which would have been a violation of their oaths.
As to the amount of punitive damages, there can hardly
be an argument. In view of the defendant's wealth, his arrogant attitude even toward his own wife when he told her
he wasn't ashamed of anything he had done (564), as well
as to-vvard the plaintiff; the fact that despite the efforts of
the plaintiff to get him to desist, he continued right up to
the time of the divorce to associate with plaintiff's wife, and
to ·collaborate with her in connection with the divorce, and
in view of the interest of his own family, plaintiff, and the
public as a whole, in having such conduct not lightly
shrugged off, the verdict should stand. Anything less than
the amount awarded for punitive damages would have been
a mere slap on the wrist.
As to the compensatory damages ·alone; they are not
by any means unprecedented in tort actions in the state
and as compared with verdicts and settlements in other
states, they may be regarded as hardly more than moderate.
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The value of the dollar has decreased considerably since
most of the verdicts cited by defendant were rendered.
But we do not intend to minimize the verdict. It was,
indeed, a substantial verdict for substantial injury. There
was the companionship, society, aid and conjugal affection
of one who was, before the alienation, a beautiful, talented,
accomplished, industrious and loving wife and mother. The
jury did not have to rely upon the testimony of plaintiff
only, although they had a right to do so; they had ·their
own observation, inferences to be drawn from Geraldine
Beck Wilson's testimony itself and the testimony of the
Harmers, disinterested witnesses who for seven or eight
years before the alienation had known the Wilsons intimately and had been with them and their ·children up to
four or five times a week (8-30). Can the defendant say
that the jury put too great a value on this ·conjugal relationship? We are taught that the things of the spirit are
sometimes of greater real worth than physical things and
we have examples both in life and literature which lead
some to believe that loved ones are more precious than life
itself. Be that as it may, certainly the value placed upon
the conjugal rights of the plaintiff bear true relationship
to their value as the evidence tended to show and the defendant, himself, by his conduct confinned such valuation
as being moderate indeed. Is it not true that for his association with, and affection for, plaintiff's wife he was willing to risk everything he had--including his own family,
his entire fortune and not just a relatively small portion
thereof? Even after both his own wife and the plaintiff
had discovered his purpose and had protested against its
continuation, he still valued his association with the plaintiff's wife so highly that he persistently continued his re-
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lationship with her right up to the time of the divorce and
'
afterwards.
Defendant may depreciate the value of Geraldine Beck
Wilson's affection now, but we think what John P. Curran,
Irish Advocate, in the case of Rev. Charles Massy against
the Marquis of Headford, said many years ago in a similar
case is pertinent:
J'The learned counsel has told you that this unfortunate
woman is not to be estimated at forty thousand pounds
(the ad damnum). Fatal and unquestionable is the
truth of that assertion . . . . But it is the honor,
the hope, the expectation, the tenderness and the comforts that have been blasted by the defendant and have
fJed forever that you are to remunerate the plaintiff."
Tne plaintiff was entitled not only to damages for the
temporary loss up to the time of the divorce, but his permanent or prospective loss of conjugal rights as the jury
may have determined that loss to be. Restatement of Law
of Torts, Vol. 4, Sec. 910, p. 559; Riggs v. Smith (Idaho),
11 P.2d 358.
The plaintiff was entitled to reasonable compensation
for humiliation and mental pain and suffering, upon which
it would be difficult to place an adequate price under the
circmnstances. Lambert v. Sine,
Utah
, 256
P.2d 241.

The cases cited by appellant do not indicate that the
judgment in this case is excessive or should be reduced or
set aside.
Oskamp v. Oskamp, (Ohio), 152 NE 208 (1926) is cited
by appellant on pages 17-18 of his brief in an effort to show
that the verdict in the case at bar was excessive and that
the final award of "$75,000" by the ~Ohio Appellate Court
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involved circumstances of an aggravated character as compared to the Oldr~yd case. As we shall later point out in
detail, the final award was $100,000, rather than $75,000 except as to one defendant. The Appellate Court held that
the evidence of conspiracy to alienate the husband's affections from the ·wife sustained the verdi·ct. It said:
"Some evidence was admitted that might have been excluded and some rejected that it would not have
been error to have admitted but when these instances
are considered with all the evidence on the issue presented in this case, no prejudicial error has intervened.
A review of the evidence offered by the defendants below left the impression that an effort was being made
to establish that W. Herbert Oskamp, by his voluntary
act, ended his marital relations with his wife and that
he had just cause for so doing, or that the defendants,
while denying the conspiracy, sought to justify these
acts. The jury did not believe either of these theories."
On the question of the $100,000 awarded by the jury,
the Ohio court had this to say:
"It is argued that the verdict is excessive. We know of
. no rule by which this court could fix a sum different
than that found by the jury. We might suggest an
amount that in our opinion the jury should have found.
But there is no authority of law for us to substitute our
judgment for the verdict. Perhaps there is one element that might be considered and that is on the ques'Pon of punitive damages against Mrs. Ryan. The record of the part that she took in furtherance of the conspiracy is very limited. There was, however, sufficient
evidence to take the case to the jury and they found
that she with the others was guilty of actual malice.
In that view of the case, this court has discussed the
question of a remittitur.
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Our conclusion is that, while the jury found that Mrs.
Ryan was guilty of conspiracy, including actual malice,
toward the plaintiff, the evidence as to her is slight.
\Ve think she should be relieved of part of this verdict,
and for that reason we will require plaintiff below to
submit to a remittitur of $25,000, or a new trial will
be granted. Judgment accordingly." .

It thus appears that only as to one of the defendants,
Mrs. Ryan, was the $100,000 verdict considered out of line
and that an award of $75,000 against her was ordered, notwithstanding that "the record of the part she took in the
conspiracy was slight.'' There are no facts indicated in the
opinion as to any defendant of a character as aggravated
as is shown in the case at bar. Yet, even as to Mrs. Ryan,
concerning which the evidence was not regarded as strong,
an award of $75,000 was sustained.

Overton v. Overton, (Okla) 246 Pac. 1095, is referred
to on page 19 of appellant's brief, involved an award by
the jury of $150,000 reduced by the Oklahoma Appell~te
Court to $40,000. The comment is made by appellant that
plaintiff's husband and the defendant in that case were married after plaintiff's divorce. This does not appear to be any
more aggravated a case than where the defendant himself
was married to another woman and was a trusted friend
and physician of plaintiff and his family and he nevertheless persisted in breaking up the home of the plaintiff. In
the Overton case, the award of $30,000 punitive damages
was upheld in full and the compensatory damages reduced
by reason, at least in part, of the fact that from the divorce
of the parties, plaintiff already had received a division of
community property from her husband (p. 1098).
The California case of Mohn v. Tingley, 217 Pac. 733,
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(decided in 1923) , cited by appellant in page 18 of his brief,
is sought to be distinguished from the instant case by the
statement that the court there found a malicious and persistent course of conduct to engender ill will between husband, wife and child and that the defendant had induced
plaintiff to contribute about $300,000 to a society of which
defendant was the head. A verdict of $75,000 compensatory and $25,000 punitive damages was upheld by the Supreme Court of California. The evidence showed in that
case an improper and unjustifiable interfe~rence with the
marriage of the plaintiff by the defendant made possible
by undue influence of the defendant. But hardly less can
be ~said of the situation in the case at bar, such influence being gained by the relationship of family friend and physician; and while the means utilized by appellant in the case
at bar were more adroit and ·concealed, they were equally
wilful, intentional and improper.
The case of Scharwath v. Brooks, 145 Atl. 727 and 150
Atl. 211 (decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
1929) is cited in appellant's brief by reason of verdicts of
$90,000 and $70,000 having been successively set aside and
a reduction to $20,000 ordered on the second appeal as an
alternative to a new trial. In this ·case, however, as a result of the alienation and subsequent divorce, plaintiff had
received a $35,000 house, $20,000 in cash and $4,000 per
year, which the New Jersey_ court felt should have been
taken into consideration by the jury in fixing the award.
Wilson gained nothing by the alienation, the result being
not only the loss of the aid, companionship, comfort and
society of his wife, his mental distress and humiliation and
the other elements of damage, but the monetary obligations
assessed against him in the divorce action. There is noth-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
ing in the opinions to indicate that the facts are analogous
to those of the instant case either in respect to the loss suf..
fered by plaintiff, the acts of the defendant or defendant's
ability to respond to punitive damages.
Slaughter v. Van Winkle, 2 P.2d 789, cited on page 19
of appellants brief, was decided in 1931 and involved an
aunt with ·whom th parties lived. The facts do not appear
comparable.
In Doroszka v. Lavine, 150 Atl. 692 (1930), ·cited on
pp. 19·20 of appellant's brief, the jury awarded $20,000 and
$26,025 in suits for alienation and malicious prosecution.
The trial court set aside the verdict as excessive. The Supreme Court of En'ors of Connecti·cut upheld the trial court
in setting aside the verdict on the grund that "sympathy,
prejudice or other inadmissible considerations" were responsible, but also held that the trial -court erred in failing
to set aside the verdict conditionally, saying:

"We think that the trial court should have exercised
the discretion vested in it to condition its action, and
the consequent retrials, upon plaintiff's refusal to accept a remittitur reducing each verdict to such sum as,
in its judgment, would constitute just compensatory
damages in each ·case. The practice of thus granting
a new trial nisi, in certain cases where the damages
awarded by the verdict are clearly excessive, is a beneficial one to the parties and is in no sense a usurpation
of the functions of the jury. (citing) Noxon v. Remington, 78 Conn. 296, 61 Atl. 963."
It is pointed out in this case that under the laws of Connecticut punitive damages are limited in amount to the costs
of litigation.
In Lindenberger v. Klapp, 254 Ill. Appl. 192 (decided
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in 1929') cited on page 21 of appellant's brief, a verdict of
$90,000 reduced by the trial court to $45,000 was set aside
on the ground of passion and prejudice. However, the facts
in the Illinois case were that the plaintiff, both before and
after the separation, continued to drink to excess and to live
and associate with tmdesirable people, and he had been
afflicted with venereal disease.
In the case of Allen v. Rossi, (Maine) 146 Atl. 692, cited
on page 21 of appellant's brief, the court colnmented on setting aside the judgment that there was no evidence of the
salary of the defendant, his age, his repute for wealth, his
actual wealth or his property.
Wood v. Miller (Wash), 265 Pac. 727, cited on page 21
of appellant's brief, as pointed out by him, held a $20,000
judgment excessive; but there the court pointed out that by
the testimony of both, their relations prior to the alleged
alienation were rather sordid no matter who was believed;
they had no children, no hope of children, they had both
been in jail, they had had repeated violent physical encounters, their home was a house of public entertainment and
they had each been married before. Moreover, punitive
damages we·re not recognized in Washington.
Also ·cited in the same paragraph of appellant's brief
are Essig v. Keating, 291 Pac. 323, and Thompson v. Thompson, 6 P.2d 617, from the same jwisdiction. In the first
case, the court reduced a judgment from $12,500 to $5,000,
pointing out that the plaintiff "had become addicted to
practices and vices" which must ultimately have led to a
separation anyway, and that no punitive damages are recognized in that state. In the second ·case cited, the verdict
was not reduced to $5,000 as stated by appellant, but to
$2,500. However, the marriage was of only a year's dw--
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ation, the defendants were the parents of the husband and
\vere sued by the wife. The court indicated that the evidence was slight as to alienation and the loss by the wife in
any Event was little
that of "her shiftless, indolent, irresponsible and lazy young husband." Contrast this with
the loss of plaintiff's wife in the case at bar, who had been,
prior to her alienation, an attractive, loving, companionable
and industrious wife and mother.
The Idaho case of Summerfield v. Pringle, 144 P.2d 214,
cited on page 22 of appellant's brief, where. a verdict as re-duced by the appellate court to allow $20,000 compensatory
and $1,000 punitive damages was sustained, involved a
marriage of relatively short duration and the mother of the
husband of plaintiff was the defendant. The rule is expressly recognized, however, that the fact that the evidence
in an action for alienation is circumstantial does not impair
its usefulness or deprive it of its potency. The different
rule applying to parents also is stated to the effect that
parents have a presumptive right to be interested in the
affairs of their married children and to advise them concerning such affairs and in order to establish their liability,
it must be shown that the parents acted maliciously and
with jntent to alienate the affections of the child. Dr. Oldroyd had no such presumed right; his status was a mere
interloper without any semblance of justification or excuse,
made doubly unjustifiable by the relation of doctor-patient
on which it presumed.
The summory of cases in 69 ALR, 1279, et. seq., contains many of the cases cited by appellant and others not
cited. The notable features of this annotation and the supplemental decisions are that few, if any, of the cases reported involve such strong evidence of the loss of an ac-
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complished and loving wife with its incidents of humiliation and mental pain and suffering on the one hand, with
circumstances ·of such persistent and unjustifiable interference on the other. The advice of the physician, Dr. Oldroyd, to his patient and friend when plaintiff consulted him
as to the coldness of plaintiff's wife, that the situation should
be analyzed to see what was the matter, when all the time
defendant was making love to plaintiff's wife, is a situation
that would be worthy of some tragic drama.
Smith v. Sheffield, 58 Utah 77, 197 Pac. 605, cited by
appellant on page 23 of his brief,·characterizes by way of
dicta the $25,000 verdict therein awarded as "palpably excessive" but declined to pass upon the question of whether
it could be considered the result of passion and prejudice.
The facts involved in the present ·case are not comparable.
In the case of Wheat v. D. & R. G. R. R. Co., - - Utah
, 250 P .2d 9-32, cited by appellant to bolster
his argument that the entire verdict should be set aside and
not merely reduced, the verdict attacked in the Supreme
Court was in fact sustained. The Court points out that
mere e~cessiveness of a verdict, without mo~, does not
necessarily show that the verdict was arrived at by passion
or prejudice. Pauly v. McCarthy, 100 Utah 431, 184 P.2d
123. In the Wheat case, this Court also quotes with approval the language of Geary v. Cain, 69 Utah 340, 255 Pac.
423, that "in case of doubt, the deliberate action of the trial
court should prevail, otherwise this court will sooner or
later find itself usurping the functions of both the jury and
the trial court, in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of
the Constitution."
To the same effect is the recent case of Merlene Lodder v. Western Pacific Railroad Co. and Richard White, de-
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cided by the Utah Supreme Court, being Supreme Court
number 7809, and not yet published in the advance sheets. ·
In that case, the court states, "But we find no case where
this Court has held as a matter of law passion and prejudice
were shown merely by the excessive amount of the verdict.''
The jury heard the evidence, assessed the damages.
The trial court did not consider the verdict excessive. We
do not think it is, as to either compensatory damages or
punitive damages. There is no indication of any passion or
prejudice for or against either party. If the verdict might
be considered excessive by some, including the defendant,
it is only because different persons may differ as to their
valuations. If this Court should have a different idea of
damages and believe the verdict should be reduced it probably has the power to do so, but that would be no indication
that the entire verdict should be set aside. But we earnestly
believe that no reduction whatever is called for or would
be justified and that any reduction would serve not the
purpose of law or justice but only that of those who too
lightly regard the value of the marriage relation.
In the ·case of Wocxlhouse v. Woodhouse (1925), 99
Vt. 91, 130 Atl. 758, $125,000 damages in an alienation of
affection suit were sustained 'by the appellate court as not
excessive. The jury had awarded $465,000, of which $65,000 was for punitive damages and the trial ·court reduced
the judgment to $125,000, of which $25,000 was punitive
damages. In sustaining this award, the appellate court
pointed out that both husband and wife were in the prime
of life (as is the case with the Wilsons), and that (as was
the case here) , there was every prospect of many years of
a happy marriage but for the alienation. It was also true
that the alienated spouse was well to do, but the court put
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equal emphasis upon his personal attributes prior to the
alienation, which find a comparison in those of Geraldine
Wilson since, prior to her close association with Dr. Oldroyd, the jury was authorized to find that she was an ac..
complished, loving and personable mother and wife.
The amount of the judgment is fully justified from ev..
ery standpoint, and should be permitted to stand WJimpaired.

Point m. There is abundant evidence to sustain th.e verdict against defendant and the court did not err in refusing
to grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict or in faDing to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was
against t~ e'Vidence or on the ground that the verdict was
excessive or given under the influence of passion or prejudice.

The appeHal'lt says that there js an absolute absence
"·
of any proof of financial loss to plaintiff. He misconceives
the nature of the· loss for which recovery may be had, which
is not limited to out..of-pocket loss, but includes the far
more important value of the conjugal rights and affections
of which he was deprived, as wen as mental pain, suffering
and humiliation proximately caused by defendant's wrongful acts. He also asks what does the award of $50,000 compensatory damages represent--it is pain and suffering,
humiliation or loss of association with plaintiff's wife up to
the time his wife obtained a divorce? "Does it include, as
instruction No. 8 implies, disruption of his family life when
his divorce from his former wife had become final more
than six months prior to the time such instruction was
given?"
Defendant fails to recognize tllat the loss of conjugal
rights up to the time of the divorce is only a small part of
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the basis for damages, for the jury, as heretofore pointed
out, was authorized to return damage for all loss, whether
past, present or prospective, which they found proximately
resulted from the wrongful acts of the defendant. Appellant further questions the right to damages awarded because plaintiff had social contact with another woman ''during the time he was the legal husband of Geraldine Beck
Wilson." He fails to point out to the Court that any such
contact was not only after the disruption of his home by
Dr. Oldroyd but after the divorce case was tried. We suspect that the law does not require one to become a total
recluse after his wife has been taken away from him, as
here, under penalty of losing his claim for damages; but be
that as it may, there is absolutely nothing in the record
that would either require or justify the jury in finding that
the plaintiff was guilty of any improper, or any other association, which in any way affected the damages awarded.
The defendant's innuendo is groundless.
The diatribe concerning the claimed ego of plaintiff,
appearing on page 26 of appellant's brief, finds foundation
only in the mind of the defendant and perhaps in the attitude of plaintiff's wife after her attitude had ibeen influenced by the defendant. Certainly there is no justification
for it in any evidence which the jury was bound to believe.
Appellant on page 26 of his brief seems to admit that
the damage awarded would be proper "where the affections
of a woman who was madly in love with a kind, considerate
and loving husband were stolen by one who pursued her
and by gifts, blandishments ·and false accusations against
her husband, induced her to give herself to him and debauched her." We will let appellant's counsel involve the
question of debauchery since we have chosen to let the cir-
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cumstances speak for themselves, but on the other points,
the jury had the right, and we think by the evidence were
required, to find at least the substance of what is outlined.
Just because appellant in vindictiveness, disappointment or
sheer determination to a void his responsibilities chooses to
disparage the plaintiff now, does not mean that the jury
had to believe his theory in arriving at their verdict.
The plaintiff's evidence directly showed, admissions of
the defendant indicated, and independent testimony corroborated the fact, that Dale Wilson. was a kind, considerate
and loving husband and that his wife was genuinely in love
with him, had borne him two children, whom they were
raising in an atmosphere of mutual love, respect and understanding, in a fine relationship that there was every indication would be permanent, and that the defendant, by taking advantage of his friendship for Dale Wilson and the latter's friendship for him, and the relations of physician and
· patient, and physician and nurse, by gifts or promises of
gifts, blandishments, love-making, concealment and pleas,
did induce her to give her affection to him so that she was
carried away by infatuation to such an extent as to make
impossible the continuation of plaintiff's marriage, and so
as to induce her to testify and argue for him at the trial,
the alienation then being demonstrably complete beyond
any doubt.
Appellant contends on page 27 of his brief that the
verdict was not against him because he alienated plaintiff•s
wife, but "because defendant and plaintiff's wife were infatuated with each other." We have never before heard
it suggested that the infatuation of one married man for
another man's wife was a justification for his breaking up
a home. But if the inference is that this was a mere pas-
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sive infatuation, one needs only to look at the record, which
shows a persistent, studied, concealed, determined and aggravated program on the part of the defendant to deprive
the plaintiff of his conjugal rights and to appropriate such
rights for himself.
Berger v. Levy, (Cal) 43 P.2d 610, cited on page 27 of
appellant's brief, was not reversed and remanded for a new
trial because of insufficiency of the evidence but primarily
because the trial was had in the absence of the defendant.
The language omitted from appellant's quotation from this
case is revealing. Following the sentences first quoted by
appellant from the opinion, the court says:
"It is sufficient if it be shown that the conduct of a defendant led to a separation of the spouses and was intentional and wrongful; and it is no defense that such
conduct was not the sole cause of the separation and
loss of affection, proof that it was the procuring or controlling cause being all that is required."
Could anyone with reason ·contend that the defendant's
action in making love to plaintiff's wife, in meeting her surreptiously and kissing her repeatedly, in writing urgent love
letters to her and instructing her as to their destruction,
in arranging for their correspondence to be carried on
through other addresses, or via his attorney so that their
respective spouses would not know, in discussing and holding out substantial financial rewards to plaintiff's wife with
the inference that they would be forthcoming only if she
divorced plaintiff, with ·which plaintiff because of his modest
financial condition could not hope to compete; in denying
that he was writing or seeing Mrs. Wilson when he was arranging trysts with her, more conveniently because of his
employment as their family physician, and in meeting her
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to discuss and presumably to advise with respect to her divorce case against plaintiff,--can it be justly contended
that this action as shown by the record was not wrongful
and was not a contributing cause in the alienation? And
if it could, would anyone, except defendant, contend that
the jury was bound as a matter of law to accept such contention?
The appellant generously conceded on page 28 of his
brief that he "probably breached the social standard espoused by the trial judge and jury," but ·contends that such
breach was not the cause of the alienation. We wonder if
defendant still feels, as his actions seem to indicate, and his
present arguments seem to confirm, that at most, his making love to plaintiff's wife and the sordid concealments and
episode's involving not only plaintiff but his own wife, were
mere social errors giving rise to no responsibility or justifying no legal remedies except a declaration that they were
"a probable breach of the social standards of the trial judge
and the jury."
No court that we have ever been able to find has ever
taken such a view, and it is a sad commentary on the ideas
of the appellant concerning this Court that he supposes it
would entertain any such views. We resent the appellant's
reference to the trial judge and jury. It is true that they
were not guided by defendant's liberal ideas on the acceptability of such conduct, but neither is the law. We are confident that this ·Court, as well as the trial judge, will regard
defendant's ·conduct as involving something more than mere
social irregularities without responsibility.
On pages 29 to 39 of appellant's brief, an apparent attempt has been made to create confusion and conflict by
taking sentences or other fragments of plaintiff's testimony

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

51
out of context and by interspersing them with conclusions
and self-serving arguments without reference to the rule
that in considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict the testimony favorable to the prevailing
party must be taken as true with the reasonable inferences
therefrom. Appellant ignores the preponderance of the
evidence supporting the jury's verdict and would have this
Court completely overlook it and decide the case on the inferences and arguments which he advances. It would be
a waste of effort to attempt to follow appellant as he jumps
around in the record trying to discover and emphasize fragments of evidence which might have been favorable to him
had the jury adopted his theory. We can only refer to the
record itself and to our statement of facts in which are set
forth some of the controlling facts and circwnstances which
defendant seeks to ignore.
To build prejudice against the plaintiff, the appellant
quotes excerpts from his t~timony concerning his threats
to sue if defendant continued to interfere with his home,
avoiding the fact that plaintiff had theretofore tried almost
everything else to dissuade appellant from his apparent purpose. When even these threats failed to deter the defendant and he continued to carry on his program of romantic
conquest and collaboration with plaintiff's wife to the
threshold of her divorce, and ·beyond, the only thing that
self-respect, a sense of justice, and ·normal and legitimate
self-interest and protection would pernrlt was this legal action.

The foregoing is by way of answer to defendant's arguments under his claim of the insufficiency of the evidence
to support the verdict, and his contention that his motion
for a directed verdict or motion for a new trial should be
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granted by virtue thereof. Actually, except for the argu..
ments and inferences so answered there is no serious at..
tempt made to show that the evidence was insufficient.
There seems no real merit to defendant's contention and it
is doubtful that any is really elaimed. Authorities heretofore and hereinafter cited, as well as a number of cases
cited in appellant's brief, seem to indicate rather conclusively that the trial court committed no error in the respects
mentioned, as do the following cases:
McKinnon v. Chenoweth (~Oregon) 155 Pac. 2d 944.
Burke v. Johnson, (Ky) 118 SW (2d) 731.
Rank v. Kihm, (Iowa) 20 NW (2d) 72.
Bryand v. ~c·arrier, 198 SE 619 (N·C).
Kilgore v. Kilgore, (Fla) 19 So. 2d 305.
Smith v. S·mith, 225 SW 2d 1001.
Fitzpatrick v. Clark, 80 Pac. 2d. 183 (Cal.).
Keyes v. Churchward, 61 A. (2d) 668 (Conn).
Eklund v. Haekett, 179 Pac. 803 (Wash.).
Point IV. There was adequate evidence to authorize submission of the question O;f punitive damages to the jury.
Appellant next argues that there was no evidence of
maUce, wilfulness or wantonness on the part of the defendant to justify the submission of the question of punitive
damages to the jury. He seems to take comfort from the
fact that punitive damages are not allowed in some states
and that the action for alienation of affections. has been
abolished in others; these collateral matters have no bearing,· the only pertinent questions being, whether punitive
damages are allowable in Utah in alienation of affection
actions, and, if so, whether the evidence is sufficient to justify submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury.
Defendant is finally forced to concede by his own ar-
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gument that punitive damages are recoverable in alienation
of affection actions (p. 44 of appellant's brief) but takes
the position that they can be sustained only in the event of
actual malice. Defendant seems to interpret actual malice
as some express threat or derogatory statement concerning plaintiff. While it is true that Dr. Oldroyd was too careful and well-advised to make such open statements, it is
equally true that malice may be shown in many other ways
than by name-calling. We believe it also true that some
conduct such as that of which defendant was guilty, carries malice as its fellow-traveler by the very nature of such
conduct.
The case of Haycraft v. Adams, 24 P.2d 1110 is cited
by appellant and a quotation given which, itself, indicates
that elements other than actual malice will authorize punitive damages. The Adams case was an action for the conversion of furniture and the court held that there was
neither pleading nor proof to authorize the award of punitive damages in that case. There are cases involving suits
against parents for the alienation of the affections of their
children, but the distinction between these and such cases
as the instant one has been repeatedly pointed out. In the
case of a parent, interference with a marriage may be proper and consistent with lack of malice. Bradford v. Bradford, (Ore) 107 P.2d 106; Monen v. Monen (S. D.) 269 N.
W. 85. But the interference of a stranger with a marriage
involves other principles. Eklund v. Hackett (Wash) 179
Pac. 803. Even in the case of a parent it is held in the
Monen case that malice means the intentional doing of a
wrongful act without just cause or excuse.
On page 44 of appellant's brief it is argued that "there
is no intent, motive or design on the part of Dr. Oldroyd to
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cause a lessening of Mrs. Wilson's affections for her husband or to cause her to leave him", and that Dr. Oldroyd
just "failed to give proper consideration to the possible consequences of a display of affection for Mrs. Wilson." Finally, appellant relies on what he claims to be the general
rule that there "must be present evil motive, actual malice,
deliberate violence, oppression or fraud which elements are
all conspicuously lacking in the case now before the Court."
It seems unnecessary to argue the fine distinctions and
inferences of appellant's brief as to the various rules governing punitive damages. By any standard the evidence
was suffi,cient to authorize the submission of the question
to the jury. There might be some force in appellant's argument if the evidence would permit only of a finding that
the defendant without any improper acts on his part were
pursued without his consent and encouragement, by Mrs.
Wilson. But to indulge in such a contention, more than
reasonable inference must be disregarded; express evidence
must be ignored. Just because the defendant used concealment, secret letters, secret meetings, kisses and promises
rather than violence or force does not mean his conduct
was any less oppressive. However, violence, oppression or
fraud are only examples of the forms of malice authorizing
punitive damages.
One rule as to the award of punitive damages in Utah
is set forth in the case of Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah 295, 117
Pac. 54, wherein the Supreme Court of Utah approved the
rule as stated in 12 A. & E. Ency. L. (2nd Ed.) p. 28, as
follows:
"While the term 'gross' is constantly used in this connection, many cases explain it by declaring that the
rule of exemplary damages requires negligence in such
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degree as to amount to wantonness and positive misconduct, manifesting a conS{!ious disregard of the right
of others and a reckless indifference to consequences.
And so is ·believed to be the weight of authority."
The Court in the Rugg case also quoted with approval
the rule stated in the case of Crymble v. Mulvaney, 21 Colo.
at page 210, 40 Pac. 499, where it was said:
"To justify a recovery of exemplary damages, the act
causing the injury must be done with an evil intent
and with the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or with
such a wanton and reckless disregard of his rights as
evidences a ·wrongful motive."
Where could there be a ·case that showed a more wanton and reckless disregard of the, rights of another than the
disregard by the defendant of the rights of the plaintiff in
the instant case? The rule stated in the Rugg case, supra,
as to exemplary damages is approved in the more recent
Utah case of Calhoun v. ·Universal Credit Co., 106 Utah 166,
146 p .2d 284.
It is contended by appellant that there can be no punitive damages because when it appeared that the Wilsons
were going to separate, Dr. Oldroyd "actually interceded in
the matter and attempted to repair the breach and to persuade Mrs. Wilson to return to her husband." The fact is
that Dr. Oldroyd, when he was caught in his love affair,
went through the motions by lip-service of saying that Mrs.
Wilson should go back and that he would discontinue his
love-making, but notwithstanding such protestations, continued to write to her, meet her in secret and carry on his
romance, leading ineveitably to the breaking up of the
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ment which aggravated rather than lessened the offense
against plaintiff.
The Illinois case of Eshelman v. Rawalt, 16 ALR 1311,
131 NE 675, is referred to on page 42 of appellant's brief
on the question of the nature of the "malice" that will authorize the award of punitive damages. This case questions the amount of punitive damages therein awarded but
does not question that punitive damages were recoverable
and the decision turns more on the misconduct of counsel
for which misconduct the judgment was expressly reversed.
The doctrine of that case, with reference to punitive damages, is that they are allowable where "a wrong act is characterized by circumstances of aggravation, such as wilfulness, wantonness, malice or oppression", which is an accurate definition of defendant's acts here. They were assuredly
wilful because even after plaintiff had pled with Dr. Oldroyd
to leave his wife alone, Dr. Oldroyd continued with his
wrongful interference and while he was assuring the plaintiff that he was not writing his wife· and would not see her,
he not only was doing these things but was, by appeals,
promises, protestations and kisses, carrying on his campaign
with Geraldine Wilson. They were wanton because they
displayed an absolute ··contempt and disregard for plaintiff's conjugal rights, and they were malicious and oppressive.· 'because any such conduct is of necessity of that nature. In his attitude toward plaintiff, as well as in his attitude toward his own wife, defendant displayed a ruthlessness and determination to carry on his romance with Gera1dine Wilson which would brook no obstacle.
The annotation following the case cited from 16 ALR
beginning at page 1316, on the subject of "Punitive or Exemplary Damages in Actions for Alienation of Affections or
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Criminal Conversation", reflects the various statements of
the rule, and few, if any, cases state the rule more narrowly than appellant. Yet, under appellant's ·concept there
seems no question but that punitive damages were proper.
By the great weight of the authority, including that of Utah,
it is sufficient if a wrongful act is done intentionally and
knowingly with disregard of its injurious effect upon the
other party.
It is well stated in Butterfi~ld v. Ennis, (Mo) 186 S. ·w.
1173:
"It is true punitive damages are not allowed in the absence of malice. But the enticing away of another
man's wife is an act inherently wrong and necessarily
known to be wrong and if the alienation from the husband is intentionally done, the law implies maHce from
these facts.''
In narrowing the rules concerning punitive damages,

appellant has perhaps been unduly influenced by some of
the cases involving claimed alienation by a parent. There,
a showing of express malice is frequently expected, since
the marriage of a child does not terminate the right of the
parent to interest himself in the welfare of such ·child and
causing a breach of the marriage relation in good faith may
not result in liability because of the legitimate interest of
the parent; however, in respect to a stranger to the family
relationship, whose only object is the gratification of his
own romantic interest, the rule does not favor interference
and the intentional and wilful nature of the act would indicate malice. In either event, however, maUce may be shown
by circumstantial evidence and is not dependent upon ~y
admission of the wrongdoer, as appellant seems to contend.
Wallace v. Wallace (Mont) 279 Pac. 374, 66 ALR 587.
\
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In the case of Moore v. Grimes {Okla) 35 P.2d 944, the
court commented:
"Defendant requested certain instructions which were
refused by the court, and it is contended that the refusal was error. The instructions requested were applicable only in cases where the plaintiff sues the parent
or parents, or those standing in the relation of parents,
of the husband, or wife, whose affections were alleged
to have been alienated. There is a ~clear distinction
between a case of this kind against the parent and one
against a stranger. Parents are under obligation by
the law of nature to protect their children from injury
and relieve them when in distress. Their natural affections prompt them to interest themselves in the welfare of their children. Heisler v. Heisler (Iowa) 127
N. W. 823.
"A much stronger showing as to malice and intent is required in an action against a parent than in one against
a stranger. But it has been held that an actual intent
to alienate is not necessary if defendant's acts are inherently wrong and seductive and tend to and to have
the effect complained of. 30 C. J. 1122."
The appellant's brief (p 44) blandly asserts that "there
is no intent, motive or design on the part of Dr. Oldroyd to
cause a lessening of Mrs. Wilson's affection for her husband
or to cause her to leave him .
. the worst that can
be said is that the doctor failed to give proper consideration
to the possible consequences of a display of affection for
Mrs. Wilson." May it not with reasonable accuracy be said
that wantonness in general may be the failure to give proper consideration to the possible consequence of a wrongful
act?
When a man makes love to another man's wife, ar-
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ranges with her by elaborate and premeditated planning
to burn his letters and to send her letters through his attorney or others, \Varns her not to let her husband know,
meets her in secret, holds out a promise of financial reward
if and when a divorce is procured, and does other acts shown
or inferred by the evidence, is the jury bound as a matter·
of law to find that there is no intent, motive, malice, or design to lessen the affection of Mrs. Wilson for her husband
or to interfere with the marriage? From time immemorable, and in the knowledge of all reasonable men, such conduct has tended to break up marriages. Few, if any, marriages can survive such conduct for any length of time.
Must the jury, contrary to the law and the common knowledge of all humans, find that Dr. Oldroyd was just having
some _good, clean fun without any intent to interfere? It
is doubtful that the jury could have found this if they had
been so ·advised, for such a finding in view of the undisputed
record, we believe, would have been contrary to law. Is it
possible that their findings as actually made, could be
set aside because they failed to determine what Dr. Oldroyd
now says they should have determined? We submit that
defendant's objection to the award of punitive damages has
no merit.
Point V. The court did not err in permitting plaintiff to
present evidence of financial wealth.

The appellant indicates that this Court has not decided
the question of whether evidence of wealth of the defendant
is competent as going to the amount of punitive damages.
While the appellant cites one case where he claims such evidence was held not competent (Texas) he seems to concede
the prevailing rule that it is; and the conclusion of his arSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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gument is that if it be held that there was not sufficient evi·
dence to justify the return of a verdict for punitive dam.
ages, the court erred in receiving evidence of the wealth of
the defendant.. This we concede, but as heretofore shown,
there was adequate evidence to justify punitive damages;
and we further call attention to the fact that the court most
carefully and properly instructed the jury as to the rules
concerning the award of punitive damages, concerning
which instruction appellant has no valid complaint. The
jury were told in instruction No. 9a (file 111) that if they
found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defend·
ant wilfully and with gross and wanton disregard of plain·
tiff's rights induced plaintiff's wife to withdraw her affec·
tion from, and desert, the plaintiff an~ to give her love and
affection to the defendant, they might award plaintiff puni·
tive damages, and in such event as to punitive damages,
might give consideration to the situation of the parties and
the financial -condition of the defendant so far as shown by
the evidence.
The jury were further expressly told in the same in·
struction that they must not be influenced by evidence of
financi~il condition for any purpose except in detennining
the amount of punitive damages in case they found that
punitive damages should be assessed, and the jury were further told that they must not be influenced by evidence of
such financial condition in determining whether plaintiff
was entitled to damages. The instruction was fair, proper
and complete. No request for any different instruction on
the subject was made by defendant.
In Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 4, Sec. 908(2),
p. 555, may be found what is the prevailing rule as to the
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admission of testimony as to the wealth and financial standing of the defendant in assessing punitive damages:
"(2). When punitive damages are permissible, their
allowance and amount are within the discretion of the
trier of fact. In assessing such damages, the trier of
fact can properly consider the character of ~efendant's
act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff,
which the defendant caused, or intended to cause, and
the wealth of the defendant."
In an action for alienation of affections, the jury is al-

lowed a wide latitude in fixing damages; the jury may award
punitive damages and in fixing such damages may consider
the wealth of the defendant. Kilgore v. Kilgore (Fla), 19
So. 2d 305.
The propriety of the receipt of evidence as to the finan..
cial condition of a defendant in cases in which punitive damage.s are authorized as a means to assist in determining what
a proper amount is as an example or punishment in any
given case, is so generally recognized and approved in practice in this state as to admit of little doubt. In no such case
of which we are aware has the admissibility of such evidence been denied. In fact, the conclusion of defendant's
argument under this point seems to concede this, and only
advances the thought that if there were not sufficient evi•
dence to justify the return of punitive damages, the court
erred, not only in submitting the question to the jury but
in allowing evidence of defendant's wealth to be received.
Since there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the
question of punitive damages, the receipt of the evidence in
question was not error.
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Point VI. (a) The court did not err in instructing the
jury in instructions Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, that they should
find for the plaintiff if they found that the def~ndant persuaded the plaintiff's wife to desert or leave the plaintiff,
or that defendant's acts were the· controlling cause in alienating her affections.
The objections to the instructions discussed only swnmarily by the appellant under this heading seem to be that
the instru-ctions or some of them are merely abstract instructions or are repetitious or that they were not justified
by the evidence, there· being uncontradicted evidence, according to defendant's claims, that there was no encouragement by defendant for plaintiff's wife to leave plaintiff;
and that it was error to submit to the jury the question of
whether defendant was the controlling cause of any alienation because there was no evidence from which this might
be found.
No specific instructions are quoted and no ~citations to
the record are set forth. Defendant's argument consists
almost entirely of conclusions which we believe to be not
supported by the record.
Instruction No. 4, complained of by defendant, reads as
follows:
"4. You are instructed that in order to hold the defendant liable you must find from a preponderance of
the evidence that his acts or -conduct constituted the
controlling cause in alienating the affection of plaintiff's wife or inducing her to desert or cease her association with plaintiff as his wife. If you believe that
the acts or conduct of the plaintiff himself toward his
wife or any other cause than the acts or conduct of
the defendant constituted the controlling cause of
plaintiff's wife's desertion of the plaintiff, then the defendant should not be held liable." (File 106)
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This instruction so complained of by appellant, oddly
enough, is almost identical in substance with the instruction requested by the defendant in his request No. 4, which
is as follows:
"Request No. 4. You are instructed that in order to
hold the defendant liable for his wrongful acts, if you
find such wrongful acts, the acts of qefendant musy
(sic) have been the procuring or controlling cause of
the alienation of the affections of the plaintiff's wife.
Defendant is not liable if the acts complained of did not
alienate the affections of plaintiff's wife. Regardless
of what defendant did which he should not have done
hs is not liable unless such acts caused the alienation
of affections of plaintiff's wife. Plaintiff cannot recover damages from defendant if plaintiff's own mistreatment caused the loss of his wife's affections."
(File 79)
Again, in defendant's requests 11 and 17, the court was
asked to instruct on the same theory and, in some respects,
in the same language. Appellant should not now complain.
If the instruction had not been given, appellant would want
the judgment reversed because his theory in this respect
was not presented. Moreover, such instruction is not an
abstract instruction, as claimed by appellant, but was
given with particular reference to the specific issue at the
request of the defendant to present his theory of the case.
Instruction No. 5 as given by the court reads:
"5. You are further instructed that if you believe that
the plaintiff's wife fell in love with or transferred her
affection to the defendant without any affirmative inducement or encouragement from the defendant, then
the defendant should not be held liable herein. On
the other hand, if you find that the defendant intenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tionally encouraged plaintiff's wife to bestow her affections upon him or to withdraw her affection from
the plaintiff and that this caused a separation between
plaintiff and his wife and that without defendant's encouragement or inducement there would have been no
separation between the plaintiff and his wife, then you
should render your verdict for the plaintiff and award
him damages in accordance with instructions hereinafter given." (File 106)
This instruction is based upon defendant's requests
numbered 5, 17 and 20, and other requests (File 80, 92, 95).
It was invited by these requests, which as far as adopted
by the instruction, were correct statements of the law.
Merely because the court in the instruction also stated the
converse of the proposition advanced by defendant does not
render the instruction bad, but makes it more fair. There
is nothing abstract about it and the evidence fully justified
its being given.
Instruction No. 6 will be quoted in full and discussed
at greater length under the next subdivision of the brief.
On the points it is attacked by appellant under his Point
Six, however, i. e., that the instruction is abstract and not
justified by the evidence, that it is repetitious, there seems
no possible merit in appellant's present objections.
Neither is instruction No. 7 abstract, needlessly repetitious or subject to the objection that the evidence did not
justify its submission. It likewise was primarily invited by
the requests of the defendant, and if it involves any repetition, it is the repetition of defendant's theory.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

65
Instruction No. 7 reads:
"7. In this case evidence has been given that the
plaintiff's wife obtained a decree of divorce by court
proceedings. You are instructed that this fact does
not prevent plaintiff from recovering damages herein
if you find from the evidence that the defendant, prior
to such divorce, intentionally induced plaintiff's wife
to transfer her affection to him or to desert or cease
her association with the plaintiff as his wife. On the
other hand, if you find from the evidence that plaintiff's wife determined to separate from the plaintiff because of acts or conduct of the plaintiff, and without
wrongful encouragement or inducement from the defendant, then the defendant should not be held liable.
In any event you should not hold the defendant liable
unless you find from a preponderance of the evidence
that wrongful acts or conduct on the part of the defendant were the controlling cause of inducing the plaintiff's wife to withdraw her affections from the plaintiff or to cease her association with him as his wife."
(File 107-108)
The appellant does not expressly claim any error in instruction No.3, but uses the same argument on page 47 to
49 of his brief with respect to No. 3 as he does with respect
to Nos. 4, 5, and 7. The argument with respect to instruction No. 3 is likewise without merit.
Neither of the ·cases cited by appellant on this phase
of the case is in point. Smith v. Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 Pac.
653, was a suit for false arrest in which a general instruction was held inapplicable to a co-defendant. Jensen v. Utah
Railway Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 Pac. 349, criticizes abstract
instructions having no direct relationship to the particular
issues involved; but it is clear from the discussion in this
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case that the instructions given in the case at bar were
not abstract instructions but on the whole were in the concrete form recommended by this Court, giving to the jury
what the law was as applied to the facts stated, if so found
by the jury. We quote from the opinion in the Jensen case
(p. 357):
"
. . The only guidance which the jury had was
the mere abstract statement that, if an adult or a child
goes upon the property of another without right to do
so, he is a trespasser. But when a per.son has a right
to do so, or more properly speaking, when he may do
so without being characterized as a trespasser as a
matter of law, the jury were given no guidance and
were left to determine for themselves what in their
judgment did, or did not, constitute a right. In that
the jury were given an unbounded field. The court did
not on ·any stated or assumed facts, if so found by the
jury, direct them as to the legal effect thereof as to
the question of trespass.
"As a general rule a trial court should not leave the
jury to apply more general principles of law to a case,
as here was done by the defendant's request. The
court should give the jury what the law is as applied
to the facts either stated or assumed and if so found
by the jury. The rule is well settled that instructing
a jury as a mere abstract or general statement as to
the law should be avoided and that all instructions
should be applicable to evidence on either one or the
other of the respective theories of the parties."
No substantial departure from these principles is indicated. Neither error nor prejudice has been shown by defendant as concerns the instructions in question.
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Point VI. (b) The court did not err in instruction No. ~
in recognizing the possibility of a reconciliation be.tween
man and \\ife, and thfl appellant's objection dwells with
only a part of the instruction whereaS the entire instruction, when considered with the other instructions of the
court, is proper !and in any event could not have been prejudicial.

It is interesting to note appellant's incongruous argument on this phase of the case. In effect it is now conceded,
in an attempt to gain a point, that his contention that there
was no competent evidence to sustain the verdict, is without merit. Appellant says (pp. 49-50), ''If Dale Wilson's
testimony is to be believed, there was no strained relationship between himself and wife prior to that time (prior to
the time Mrs. Wilson became well acquainted with Dr. Oldroyd) and only on such a basis could the jury have found
any substantial damages in the case." Under his previous
argument defendant contended without qualification that
there was no evidence to support the award of substantial
damage.
We may say that the great preponderance of the· evidence, both from plaintiff and from independent witnesses,
was that Dale and Geraldine Wilson were most affectionate
and happy prior to Dr. ·Oldroyd's intervention. Appellant
now seems to concede at least that there is substantial evidence from which the jury had a right to believe that no
strained relationship before existed, so that the remaining
question raised by appellant is whether instruction No. 6 in
connection with the other instructions of the ~court prevented a fair determination of this issue, or whether it was otherwise prejudicial.
The quotation of instruction No. 6 in appellant's brief
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

68
is incomplete, out of context and therefore misleading. We
quote the instruction in full:
"6. The defendant eontends in this case that Geraldine Beck Wilson had ceased to have affection for the
plaintiff prior to the time of the acts complained of
and that therefore the defendant cannot be held liable
for alienating her affections from plaintiff. In regard
to this contention, you are instructed that so long as
the marriage status continues between a husband and
wife, the law presumes that there is a possibility of a
reconciliation between the parties even though they
have become estranged or have had marital differences.
It is therefore wrongful and unlawful for another man
to court or make love to a married woman or to wilfully encourage her to give up her affection, if any, for
her husband, and if he does this and thereby causes
the wife to give up her affection, if any, for her husband, or to desert or refuse to live with her husband,
then he is liable in damages to the husband." (File
107).
Almost the entire basis of appellant's attack on this
instruction _is the quotation from the case of Buckley v.
Francis, supra, presented on page 51 of appellant's brief.
It is submitted that the case cited is not in point; and that
there is no doctrine therein announced which vitiates the
instruction in the instant case; that the sta.tement of the
trial court herein when considered in connection with the
other instructions given, was correct, and in any event, that
the instruction was not prejudicial to the defendant. Under any reasonable view we do not think it could have been
prejudicial, but we go further, and assert that it is a proper
and correct statement of the law.
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In plaintiff's request No. 14, he requested the court to
instruct, among other things, as follows:

"You are instructed that the mere fact that a husband
and wife are not living together at the time does authorize a third party to wilfully alienate the affections
of the wife from the husband for the husband has the
right to endeavor to effect a reconciliation or reunion
free from, and without, any unlawul alienation of the
affections of his wife from hi·m." (File 48) .
Instruction No. 6 given by the court, while not using
the form of this request, involved the same principle. The
use of the term "presumption" was simply as a means of
indicating that the marriage relation is entitled to protection from unlawful interference based upon the possibility
mentioned. If the law is not as stated in instruction No. 6,
any person with impunity could make love to a married
woman or turn her against her husband had there theretofore been friction or an estrangement between them. The
reason that this is not lawful is that possibility of a reconciliation which the law always recognizes.
The converse of this instruction would mean that a
married woman separated from her husband is open game
for anyone who wants to take her out or make love to her
and that her husband cannot ·complain. If the husband
may complain, it is only because of the possibility that he
might affect a reconciliation or a reunion and that the law
presumes in all cases that there is such a possibility. It
should be noted that the instruction does not say that there
is a presumption that there is affection or that liability will
result. What it does say is that it is wrongful for another
man to court or to make love to a married woman or to wilfully encourage her to give up her affection, if any, for her
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husband. Can this proposition be questioned? Can it be
said under any circumstances involved here that it was
rightful and lawful for the defendant to court or make love
to Mrs. Wilson while the marriage relationship existed?
The proposition may be stated with like effect as follows:
There is a- possibility of reconciliation and that therefore in
any case a stranger should not act to foreclose that possibility by courting or making love to an.other man's wife.
Or we may say that there is a presumption of such reconciliation but whatever reason is assigned, or in whatever
form, the court, as was its duty, announced the law that it
is wrongful for one man to court or to make love to another
man's wife, something that even now the defendant at least
inferentially concedes. The jury, however, had left to it,
entirely free from any presumption, the question of whether
such conduct was the controlling cause of any alienation
and if so, as to whether any damage resulted.
If this is not the law, then our whole attitude and concept With respect to marriage, family and home in this state
will be broken down. To be instrumental in such breakdown would be of dubious distinction to the very Courts
which heretofore have been the bulwarks of the institution
of marriage. If it is the law, the instruction was proper,
especially in view of the latter part of the instruction which
appellant omitted from his brief, ". . . . . it is therefore
wrongful and unlawful for another man to court or make
love to a married woman or to wilfully encourage her to
give up her affection, if any, for her husband, and if he does
this and thereby causes the wife to give up her affection,
if any, for her husband, or to desert or refuse to live with
her husband, then he is liable in damages to the husband."
The court in no sense forecloses the jury from determining
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whether the acts of the defendant caused any damage.
They were told that if the defendant made love to, or courted, plaintiff's wife that was wrongful, the mention of the
presumption simply being the reason for such statement,
but the instruction left to them the determination of whether this was the proximate cause of her giving up her affection, if any, or deserting or refusing to live with her husband. Merely ~because in the beginning of the instruction
"presumption" was used, appellant has seized upon the word,
as a mere word, in an attempt to make the instruction something that it does not even suggest when the entire instruction is read.
Moreover, the entire instructions must be read and considered as a whole; the theories of the appellant were fully
presented and when it came to the presentation of one of
appellant's theories, to-wit: that if there were any difficulty
between a married man and his wife, a stranger to the marriage could make love, court or interfere to his heart's content and· such acts would not ~be wrongful, the court was
obliged to state the law to the jury, that no matter what,
if any, troubles there were, since the possibility of a reconciliation always must be, and is, recognized by the law, outside interference is not lawful, and if such outside interference of the nature described does in fact prevent a reconciliation and alienates the affections of the wife from the
husband, there is liability. As pointed out above, the instructions left to the jury the question of whether there was
any such interference, whether it resulted in an alienation
or desertion, and if so, the amount of the damages, if any.
In addition thereto, a number of other instructions particularly emphasized in appellant's behalf his theories of
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crete form, removing any possibility of misunderstanding.
·Fbr example, in instruction No. 7, the jury were told:
"..

.

.

.

On the other hand, if you find from the

evidence that plaintiff's wife determined to separate
from the plaintiff because of the acts or conduct of the
plaintiff, and without wrongful encouragement or inducement from the defendant, then the defendant
should not be held liable. In any event you should not
hold the defendant liable unless you find from a preponderance of the evidence that wrongful acts or conduct on the part of the defendant were the controlling
cause of inducing the plaintiff's wife to withdraw her
affection from the plaintiff or to cease her association
with him as his wife." (File 107-108).
Again in instruction No.-5, the jury were told:
"If you believe that the plaintiff's wife fell in love with,
or transferred her affection, to the defendant without
any affirmative inducement or encouragement from
the defendant, then the defendant should not be held
liable herein." (File 106).
In instruction No. 4, the court said, among other things~

that:
"If you believe that the acts or conduct of the plain-tiff himself toward his wife, or any other cause than
the acts or conduct of the defendant constituted the
controlling cause of plaintiff's wife's desertion of plaintiff, then the defendant should not be held liable." (File
106).
Again, in instruction No. 3, the jury were instructed:
"Unless you find from the preponderance of the evidence that the defendant intentionally encouraged and
induced the plaintiff's wife to give to him, the defend-
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ant, her love and affection, or to abandon her a,ssociation with the plaintiff as his wife or to withdraw her
affection from the plaintiff, then your verdict on plaintiff's complaint should be for the defendant, no cause
of action." (File 105-106).
The court was exceedingly fair, if not generous, toward
the defendant in presenting very strongly against plaintiff
all of defendant's theories that had any possible merit.
However, the defendant apparently wished the court to go
further and approve the pattern which obviously had been
designed in the mind of the defendant as a sure means of
avoiding liabiliay for his romantic association with plaintiff's wife.
Dr. Oldroyd testified that his attorney had told him
what to say to Mr. Wilson (517, 518). It is true, he added,
that it was to tell the truth, but the jury was authorized to
find at least that the defendant, despite any injunctions of
his counsel, did not tell the whole truth. He apparently
had been advised not to be seen alone with Mrs. Wilson. He
apparently was conferring and corresponding with Mrs. Wilson concerning the case, as ~well as on personal matters, and
it is no wonder that she so steadfastly attempted to support
his theory that there could be no liability because she was
not, as she claimed, affectionate toward Dale even before
the defendant's interference. The defendant was carrying
on correspondence with Mrs. Wilson through other people
(60, 61, 62), and advised the destruction of all correspondence (61, 62). He apparently had been warned that he
should not give any money or property to Mrs. Wilson while
she was Dale's wife; at least he said he would like to but
couldn't as long as she was Dale's wife (544, 545). If he
would state this to his own wife, it is a fair inference that
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he had told Mrs. Wilson that when she was no longer plaintiff's wife he would do something for her.
All in all, the defendant had ·what he, no doubt, regarded as a perfect formula for carrying on an affair with
another man's wife without liability. The love-making
would be discreet and secret. The wife would testify that
she didn't love her husband anyway, and if the court could
be induced to instruct the jury that if there were any friction between the Wilsons before defendant's interference,
such interference would be lawful and proper, the formula
would be complete. What the defendant failed to take into
consideration was that whether there is great or little affection between husband and wife, no stranger to the marriage can rightfully or lawfully court or make love to the
wife. It is true that there may be great or little affection
and if one alieantes such affection the degree thereof will
determine the amount of damages, if any, as found by the
jury. It is also true that the existence of affection, if any,
is a question o[ fact and such affection will not be presumed.
These factors were all recognized in the instructions and
they were left to the jury's determination. However, the
defendant wished the trial court, and now wishes this Court,
to go further and say that if there were difficulty between
husband and wife, such pre-existing difficulty would make
interference with the marriage relation rightful and lawful.
This is not the law, and the ·court in instruction No. 6 simply recognized that such interference would not be rightful
or lawful because, among other things, of the possibility of
a reconciliation even though there may have been some previous estrangement. The instruction in this respect was
adverse to plaintiff, if anything, assuming as it did that
there was prior estrangement when the great preponderance
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of the evidence was to the contrary. However, the jury
was left to determine whether the defendant by any unlawful love-making contributed as a controlling cause to
the separation and loss of affection, and as to the amount
of the damages, if any. The instruction was proper, deprived defendant of no right or defense, was not prejudicial
to him in any event, and defendant is in no position to complain.
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that
no error is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise
disturbing a judgment unless refusal to take such action
appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.
The court at every stage of the proceedings must disregard
any error or defect which does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties. This principle was recognized in view
of technical error, in upholding the judgment in Fowler v.
Medical Arts Building, 112 Utah 367, 188 P.2d 711. In the
instant case there was not even a technical error since the
defendant had no right to have the jury told that love-making with plaintiff's wife was either lawful, rightful or proper; but in any event by repeated instruction, both in No.
6 and others, the jury was furthermore told that unless they
found that defendant's love-making, however wrongful, was
the controlling cause of the break-up of plaintiff's marriage,
they should find for the defendant.
The case of Buckley v. Francis, supra, exclusively relied upon by appellant in this phase of the argument, turns
upon a different point than that involved in this case. The
question of the existence of affection is a question of fact,
which might go both to the question of liability and the
question of the extent of damages. This Court has held that
it was improper for the jury to be told to presume affection,
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as this question should be determined from the evidence.
No instruction of the court in the instant case instructed the
jury to this effect, but on the contrary, the jury was told
respecting this phase that if they found that the loss of affection was from some other cause, they should find for the
defendant, and if. his acts were not the controlling cause of
the estrangement, which it was admitted existed at the
trial, they should find for the defendant.
If the court had directly said that it is the law that
intermeddling with a marriage through love-making with
the wife by a stranger to the marriage is wrongful notwithstanding that there are difficulties between her and her
husband, so long as the marriage continues, among other
reasons, because there may be possibilities of a reconciliation, all of defendant's present arguments would be obviated since the mere word "presume" or "presumption" is
endowed by him with some unacceptable connotation, not
only in the sense passed upon by Utah Court in previous
cases, but in every instance of the use of the term. Y,et,
the court's instruction had the same meaning as if the term
were not used.
In Moelleur v. Moelleur (Mont), 173 Pac. 419, many of
the rules involved in the case at bar are treated by the court
in upholding a verdict of both compensatory and punitive
damages. We quote from the opinion:
"The rules of law governing an action of this character are well stated:
"(a) This action cannot be maintained if it appears
that Dr. Moelleur voluntarily bestowed his affections on
Mrs. Reynolds, the latter doing nothing wrongful to
win them (citing authorities).
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"(b) Even though plaintiff's conduct towards her hus~
band was a subsidiary cause of alienation, she is not
barred from recovery; but the fact of their domestic
trouble might be considered by the jury in mitigation
of damages. Morris v. Warwick, 42 Wash. 480, 85 Pac.
42, 7 Ann Cas 687 and note 689; Baird v. C'arle, 157
Wis. 565, 177 NW 834; Hadley v. Heywood, 121 Mass.
236.
"(c) Even though there had been estrangement between plaintiff and her husband, so long as they remained husband and wife, plaintiff had the right tor~
ly upon the possibility of reconciliation; and defendant
had no right to intermeddle, and if she did so, she must
answer for the consequences. Rott v. Goehring, 33 NiD
413, 157 NW 294, LRA 1916E 1086, Ann Cas 1918A
643, and note 647; Miller v. Pearce, 86 Vt. 322, 85 Atl.
620, 43 LRA (NS) 332; 13 RCL 1465.
"The jury was authorized to believe the evidence offered on behalf of plaintiff and refuse to accept defendant's theory of the case. In this view we assume that
plaintiff's version was accepted, and if the evidence offered in her behalf, with the legitimate inference to be
drawn from it will justify a verdict in her favor, we
are not at liberty to interfere . . . .
"In Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621, 32 Am. Rep.
397, it is said: 'The term malice as applied to torts does
not necessarily mean that which must proceed from
a spiteful, malignant or revengeful disposition, but a
conduct injurious to another, though proceeding from
an ill-regulated mind, not sufficiently cautious before
it occasions an injury to another. If the conduct of the
defendant was unjustifiable and actually caused the injury ,complained of by plaintiff, which was a question
for the jury, malice in law would be implied from such
conduct.'
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''This is the rule recognized and enforced by the courts
generally. Boland v. Stanley, 88 Ark. 562, 115 SE 163,
129 Am. St. Rep. 114; Sickler v Mannix, 68 Neb. 21, 93
NW 1018, 3 Words and Phrases (2d Ed) 224, and under it the question of the existence of malice was properly submitted to the jury."
McKinnan v. Chenoweth (Ore) 155 P.2d 944, holds that
in an action for alienation of affections of plaintiff's wife,
plaintiff was entitled to an instruction that he need not show
love and affection for his wife, that unpleasantness of their
home life would not justify the defendant in intermeddling
with plaintiff's domestic affairs and that plaintiff was entitled to a verdict if his wife would have remained with him
but for defendant's wrongful acts; whether defendant's intermeddling with plaintiff's domestic affairs was a controlling cause of any alienation, was question for the jury, and
that an instruction that the verdict should go for plaintiff
if defendant's acts were intentional and the controlling cause
of the alienation was proper. It was further held that misconduct of plaintiff's husband will not palliate the offence
of enticing of a wife's affections, although domestic unhappiness and discord not brought about by defendant, may
serve to mitigate damages. It is further held that the declaration of a deserting wife in defendant's absence are admissible to prove the state of her affections and her motive
and effect produced upon her mind by defendant's conduct
notwithstanding that such declarations involve statements
of acts done or words spoken by the defendant, but that
declarations of the wife in absence of the defendant are inadmissible if they constitute nothing but a recital or narrative of what has been done or said, and are not a spontan-
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eous manifestation of the then existing emotions which inspired and produced the declarations.
Monson v. Solace, supra, passes on another issue involved in the case at bar.. We quote from pages 1104-1105
of the opinion:
"It is appellant's apparent contention that if the divorce which it is alleged was obtained was actually obtained on grounds which existed independently of the
statements which defendant caused to ·be conveyed to
the wife, then there is no cause of action stated. Such
is not the law. It may be a defense to such an action
that plaintiff himself, caused the alienation or that the
affections ·were voluntarily withdrawn by plaintiff's
spouse. However, even though there had been an estrangements, so long as they remained husband and
wife, a plaintiff has the right to rely upon the possibility of reconciliation, and any one who intermeddles
and thus prevents a reconciliation, must suffer for the
consequences.''
A husband's ill treatment of his wife was no justification for, or palliative of, defendant's conduct, causing or
contributing to husband's loss of his wife's affections.
Squire v. Hill, 66 P.2d 822, 100 Colo 226. It is also held in
this case that while the presumption that a husband living
with his wife has her affection could be overthrown, yet the
matter was properly submitted to the jury under an instruction that "if you believe that plaintiff has lost the love
of his wife and that the acts and ·conduct of the defendant
were the procuring or contributing cause therefor, you
should find for the plaintiff, notwithstanding that you may
believe that there were other contributing causes."
In Summerfield v. Pringle (Idaho) 144 P.2d 214, the
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ized by the contention that the affections in question had
been lost before the wrongful acts of the defendant. This
contention was rejected by the court. The following instruction was held to be proper:
"12. You are instructed that although the marriage
of a child does not terminate the right of a parent to
interest herself in a child's welfare or happiness, and
that a parent may cause a -breach in marital relations
for good cause and in good faith, and that the law presum·es that the advice, acts and conduct of a parent towards a child is in good faith, such presumption may
be overcome by evidence that the interference on the
part of such parent is unwarranted, without excuse or
reason induced by improper motives."
In no case that we have seen, however, has it been presumed or indicated that interference with a marriage by a
stranger to the marriage bent on ,making love to the wife
is anything but wrongful. In view of the law on the subject, the instruction as a whole and the other instructions
of the court, there was no error in instruction No. 6, and
in any event if any hyper-technical exception could be taken to its wording in any respect no prejudice could have
been suffered by the defendant.
Point VI. (c) The court did not err in instructing the
jury with respect to punitive damages in instruction No.
9(a).

The appellant's attacks under the corresponding point
in his brief ·are that the evidence did not authorize submission of this issue, and that the instruction itself was not a
proper or complete definition of when punitive damages
were proper. The first basis has already been discussed
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under Point IV herein, and we will now deal primaiily with
the latter argument. The substance of appellant's argument
is that the term "wilful" was not defined in the instruction
and therefore might have been held by the jury to cover
mere acts of simple negligence. As appellant has done in
some of his other arguments on instructions, he here has
selected a fragment of one instruction out of context and
has predicated his entire argument thereon. The instruction on punitive damages, we think, limited punitive damages more narrawly than the interests of the plaintiff and
the law would justify. It was more favorable to defendant
than it should have been, since it predicated the right to
punitive damages upon wrongful acts, if any, found to be
in wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of plaintiff.
We believe that if the acts were intentionally done, considering their nature, that would be sufficient foundation for
punitive damages, particularly since the very nature of the
defendant's acts themselves was of a character per se to
authorize punitive damage. But the court instructed the
jury more favorably to the defendant, as follows:
"The plaintiff in this case, in addition to seeking a judgment for compensatory damages, is also seeking to recover punitive or exemplary damages. Punitive or exemplary damages may be awarded to a party over and
above an amount sufficient to compensate him for his
injury if it is shown that the other party has been guilty of gross or wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights.
They are allowable under the law as a punishment for
wilful and wanton wrongdoing and to set an example
to deter others from similar wilful and wanton acts.
If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages in accordance with the
evidence and instructions of the court, and then it will
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be your duty to consider and determine from the evi-

dence and under these instructions, whether or not the
plaintiff is also entitled to receive punitive or exemplary
damages. If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant wilfully and with gross and
wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights induced the plaintiff's wife to withdraw her affection from and desert
the plaintiff and give her love and affection to the defendant, you may then award the plaintiff such punitive
damages as you, in your sound judgment and honest
judgment, believe will be proper under the circumstances shown by the evidence. In fixing the amount of
punitive damages, if you find that any should be awarded, you should consider the extent of culpability and
the situation and relation of the parties and you may
give consideration to the financial condition of the defendant so far as shown by the evidence.
"The court further instructs you, however, that you
must not be influenced by evidence of the financial condition of the defendant for any other purpose except
in determining the amount of punitive damages, in case
you find that punitive damages should be assessed.
You must not be influenced by evidence of the plaintiff's financial condition in determining whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to damages, either compensatory or punitive."
The instruction of the court seems entirely consistent
with Restatement of Law of Torts, Vol. 4, Sec. 908, p. 554.
The comparatively late case of Calhoun v. Universal
Credit Co., 106 Utah 155, 146 P.2d 284, refers with approval to the rule that in order to award punitive damages, the
party must know that the act is wrongful and must do it
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intentionally without just cause or excuse.

The court in

the instant case \Vent beyond this, and required a showing
that the defendant's acts were done wilfully and in gross
and wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights.

The jury could

not have thought such language to cover a mere negligent
act as contended by defendant. Indeed, it is difficult to see
on what theory defendant claims any of the intentional,
planned acts of defendant could be merely negligent. In no
sense could the jury have been misled as the very nature
of the acts on which basis recovery was had characterized
them. Seductive acts which alienate the affections of another's wife infer the actor's purpose because in the eyes of
the law a man intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts. In this connection we also refer to the authorities considered under Point IV, and to the case of Evans v. Gaisford,

Utah

, 247 P.2d 431. There

is a vast difference between these cases where mere negligence may be involved and where the acts themselves constitute wilful disregard of the rights of others, as here. See
Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah 295, 117 Pac. 54.
The instruction of the court was ·consistent with the
controlling principle, its language was readily understandable, and in general usage and was full, fiair and proper.
No essential definitions ·were omitted and no request for any
further definition was submitted by defendant. 63 Am.- Jur.,

Sec. 630, pp. 489-490; Parry v. Hiarris, 93 Utah 317, 72 Pac.
(2d) 1044. No error, possible misunderstanding, or prejudice is indicated.
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Point Vll. The court did not err in admitting or excluding
evidence. (a) The ~court was not in error in excluding evidence regarding events occurring during Geraldine WUso,n's marrie·d life with plaintiff for the reason that the
proffered evidence was hearsay or confidential communications, and for the further reason that the same evidence
was brought out by the same witnesses in response to other
questions.

The appellant sets out a collection of brief excerpts
from questions, objections and rulings covering ten pages of
his brief and then concludes that the court erred, citing
cases having no relevancy to any particular question, ignoring the varied bases of the ruling, failing to point out any
resulting prejudice and avoiding the fact that on almost every point, by reason of repetition of questions, reframing
of them, re-direct examination, or other means, the evidence referred to was permitted to go in.
That any such rulings were without prejudice is abundantly clear and in almost every case the rulings were correct from both technlcal evidence rules and common sense
standpoints.
Defendant in the first place contends on page 55 of his
brief that the court erred in sustaining plaintiff's objection
to the question of whether at a given time Dale and she
"were getting along all right." This question was altogether
too general, and would have permitted incompetent testimony of confidentiol communications. However, the defendant was permitted to get into the record whatever he
desired to concerning the claimed attitude of Mrs. Wilson
concerning her husband when a proper foundation was laid
and questions calling for competent evidence were asked
(3191 320, 329, 330, etc.).
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The next reference is made to the court's sustaining
an objection on the ground the question was too general
and no time fixed. This ruling was entirely proper and
moreover, immediately following, by specific questions, all
of the details were brought out (331, et seq).
The objections to the duplicitous questions on page 330
\Vere properly sustained, and no authority or reason is cited
in appellant's brief to the contrary.
The question of what plaintiff was "obliged to do" was
sustained on the ground that it called for a conclusion (330)
but then the circumstances of her claimed lack of conceniences were fully gone into (331).
The appellant claims error in the ruling of page 336
of the transcript on the question of whether divorce was
discussed in 1943 or 1944 but entirely omits the following
proceedings immediately following the ruling of the court:
MR. SHiERMAN CHRISTENSON: ''If the court
please, I believe we will withdraw that objection.
THE COURT: You may answer.
A. Yes we did" (And this witness was then permitted to testify to just what she claimed was said
about a divorce.)
This is typical of appellant's objections to rulings. In
almost every instance, a ruling is selected, often based on
the mere form of the question, and error charged, when
thereafter the same evidence is received, often in greater
detail than was originally called for.
This especially applies to the striking out of Mrs. Wilson's volunteer answer to the effect that "Dr. Oldroyd ·always encouraged me to stay with my husband . ; . .",
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tion, "Did he ever encourage you to stay with your husband?." on the ground that question leading. Appellant
on page 57 of his brief urged these rulings as reasons for
reversing the case. He entirely ignores the subsequent
rulings admitting in full all claims of any such conversations
when foundations of time and place were fixed. The court
showed extreme liberality in permitting all manner of
claimed conversations on this point in the presence of the
plaintiff to be related by Mrs. Wilson (341-343). Following the material on page 57 of appellant's brief last above
referred to, appellant says:
"The witness was asked:
'''Did he ever say anything to you with respect to
staying with your husband?'
"The court directed the witness to say 'yes' or 'no'.
(p. 57. of appellant's brief.)
The record actually shows that when this question was
asked, the court simply said "You may answer 'yes' or 'no'
to that question." The witness answered "Yes", and the
court denied plaintiff's motion to strike the answer on the
ground that no foundation had been laid and by reason of
its being hearsay. So actually, instead of the ruling being
against the defendant, it was adverse to plaintiff, and im·
mediately following, over plaintiff's objection, the witness
was permitt~ to recount all details of such alleged conversation ·whether out of the presence of the plaintiff or
not.
The striking out of the latter part of Mrs. Wilson's
answer on transcript page 342, complained of by defendant,
was clearly proper. She had already assumed to give her
testimony as to all conversations dealing with the matter
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and then in connection with one of them she added as a
purely voluntary statement, "He has always encouraged
me to stay with Dale."
It is apparent that the alienation accomplished by the
defendant so continued at the time of the trial that Mrs.
Wilson was anxious, ready and willing not only to testify
for Dr. Oldroyd but to attempt to argue his ~case by repeated volunteer conclusions. Many of them were left in
the record. The jury had the right to judge her testimony
with all the other evidence in the case, and certainly was
not bound to accept it. On the other hand, the court just
as certainly was not obliged in every case to permit her voluntary arguments and conclusions to remain as evidence.
It would be unduly extending this brief to further examine point by point under this division of the argument
the ruling which appellant has singled out as erroneous.
Many of the rulings are fragmentary and out of context.
Some appear from appellant's brief to have been entirely
correct from appellant's own statement and in every instance, a reading of the transcript will show that no competent evidence in favor of appellant was precluded. In not
a single instance has appellant pointed out any evidence
1hat was not ultimately received when proper questions
were asked. Defendant points to discussions between court
and counsel out of the presence of the jury during the time
the court was endeavoring to as'Certain the points sought
to be reached and the proper forms of questions, as prejudicial rulings, whereas in every phase of the case defendant
was permitted to place before the jury all. competent evfdence concerning the relations of plaintiff and his wife and
all other material testimony, together with a good many of
Mrs. Wilson's biased conclusions, reasons and arguments
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with which she attempted to support defendant's thesis that
there was no affection to be alienated -by defendant.
In the case of Smith v. Sheffield, supra, this Court in
considering the testimony of the undivorced wife of plaintiff in an alienation of affection suit said:
"Appellant argues that to hold a husband's wife inC()mpetent as a witness against her husband unless his
consent be obtained, extends and enlarges the purpose
of the statute as expressly stated by the Legislature,
and that the purpose of the statute is that a husband
cannot be examined for or against his wife without her
consent, nor a wife for or against her husband without
his consent, as to any matter or thing which would tend
to destroy the confidence growing out of the marriage
relation. The .statute clearly presents two different
situations: first, the disqualification of either husband
or wife without the ·consent of the other to testify at
all on any subject for or against the other during the
marriage relation; second, neither can, during the marriage .or afterwards, be examined by anyone as to any
communication made by one to the other while the
marriage relation existed. The statute means what
it says and is plain, clear and conclusive. It may be
barbari~c and it may, as appellant's counsel suggest,
close the mouth of the. wife and mother and prevent
her from vindicating her honor when assailed in court.
The law may be wrong. Possibly it should be liberalized but that cannot be done by judicial construction."
The same statute was in effect the time of the trial
(Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 104-49-3 (1) ) and is now in
effect (Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 78-24-8 (1) ) .
This Court in Re: Ford's Estate, 70 Utah 456, 261 Pac.
15, and in Re: Estate of Van Alstine, 26 Utah 193, 72 Pac.
942, cited by appellant, holds that the communication or
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knowledge imparted must be such as pertain to the confidence of the marriage relations. All testimony excluded at
any stage in the proceedings by the trial court pursuant
to this statute fell clearly within this classification and there
was no testimony excluded which did not have a direct ·relationship to what was said or done in connection with the
mutual confidence made possible by the marriage relation.
In fact, dispute interim discussions and rulings, the fact is
that on every point concerning that relationship, not only
with respect to Mrs. Wilson's feelings for plaintiff, ~but as
to their confidential relations and communications, she was
permitted to get everything she claimed existed, and defendant now claims existed, before the jury, often over the objection of the plaintiff. The trial court was liberal toward
to the defendant in this respect and defendant has not pointed out any material evidence on the subject that was actually excluded or that she was not permitted to fully go into
at some stage in her testimony. No possible prejudice appears from any ruling, except as against the plaintiff who
had to meet repeated hearsay declarations made out of his
presence by Geraldine Wilson directly involving confidential communications or observations coming to her solely
as a result of the marriage relation.
Several exceptions to the rulings of the court in sustaining objections to the form of questions, to hearsay statements made by others not in the presence of plaintiff, such
as statements by Mrs. Wilson' s father, and rulings on offers which involved clearly incompetent as well as repetitious evidence, and the mass of other rulings thrown hodgepodge under this point without any showing of prejudice or
what the ultimate rulings were, all appear sufficiently without merit on their mere statement. The theory of defend•
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ant ~t the trial seemed to be that if he asked enough incompetent or borderline questions, or repeated them sufficiently
often, the trial court might be led into some technical error
to save the day; and even when the court informally discussed these questions out of the presence of the jury in
cooperation with defendant's ·counsel, its comments have
been seized upon as additional error without any showing
that any ·competent evidence was withheld from the jury.
The exclusion of even competent testimony is not reversible
error if subsequently the witness is permitted to answer
the same or substantially the same question. Fife v. Adair
(Okla), 47 P.2d 145.
The final specific claim of error made by appellant under the present phase of his argument appears on page 71
of his brief. We quote:
"We proposed to ask the following question: 'Will you
tell the court what Dale' attitude was after you returned
from California?' (383)
"To which we would expect the witness to answer:
'Well, his attitude toward me was the same as it always
was. He never paid very much attention to me. I was
there.. He expected me to be there. I was just a convenience around the house as far as Dale was concerned. He never showed me any affection.' (383-4)
"The court made the following observation: 'The
court believes that the offer of the last question, if answered as indicated, would be improper and that the
answer should be stricken upon motion.'"
We submit that the court's comment was entirely justified. It must be borne in mind that hour after hour such
offers had been made, or the right of Mrs. Wilson to thus
argue defendant's case for defendant had been contended
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for, and yet the court thus patiently ruled upon all manner
of these attempts without impatience and in a most judicious
and fair manner. Will anyone· except appellant seriously
contend. that the foregoing arguments and conclusions of
Mrs. Wilson in the form offered (which was a quotation
from her testimony in the divorce case) would have been
proper in view of the rules as to privilege, argumentative
statements, conclusions, mere narrations, or the rules requiring time and place to be fixed or those precluding mere
generalities? Bear in mind that the witness had already
been permitted to fully testify as to her feeling for ·Dale
Wilson at the ti·me of the California trip and at any·other
time about which counsel desired to ask her (320, 349, 350,
351).

All the exc;eptions argued by appellant under Point VII
(a) are similarly without merit.
Point vn. (b) · The court did not err in refusing to permit defendant to cross-examine plaintiff as to the testimony given by plaintiff's wife in the trial of tb.e divorce
action and at the taking of her deposition in that action.

Appellant's last contention is that the court erred in
precluding him from reading to the jury, on. ·cross examination of the plaintiff, from the transcript of the testimony ·
given by Geraldine Wilson ~ the divorce action between her
and the plaintiff and from her deposition in that case, and
asking plaintiff if he did not hear her testify according to the
transcripts in that ca~. Geraldine Beck Wilson in the instant case was present in court. Defendant had a right to
call her, and in fact did later call her. Yet, defendant
claimed the right to read to the jury selected extracts from
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her testimony in the divorce case against her husband, giv..
en after the parties had separated.
The divorce action was commenced July 12th, 1951,
and was tried October 24th, 25th, and 26th, 1951. Mrs. Wilson's .deposition was given in that case August 3rd, 1951
(162, 164). Dr. Oldroyd was not a party to that action.
Dale Wilson in his direct examination had claimed that the
--parties were loving and affectionate up to October, 1950,
about which time Dr. Oldroyd's close association With Mrs.
WHson apparently began (151, 155). Plaintiff was cross
examined in detail about his relationship with his wife from
the time of. the marriage up to the time he and his wife
firi.ally separated in March of 1951. He testified thart after
January 31st, 1951, the attitude of his wife with respect to
their marriage relationship was not good and that it was
oold and indifferent and that this attitude did not change
thereafter (126). He further had testified that in January, 1951, he first learned that his wife's affections for him
were gone; that at that time she told him she didn't care
for him (137). There was no claim on his part that after
that time he thoughrt his wife loved him, or was anything
but ·cold, indifferent and antagonistic toward him.
On cross examination, after covering the relationship
of plaintiff and Geraldine Wilson up to the time of the break

in January, 1951, defendant's ·counsel asked if it wasn't a
fact that plaintiff and his wife had trouble practically all
the time during their maxried life, and the witness replied
that it was not a fact (158). Plaintiff was then asked if
plaintiff had heard his wife testify in the divorce action,
and upon plaintiff saying that he had, plaintiff was asked:
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"Did you hear your wife say that she had had
trouble from time to time since the first year of your
marriage?"
Q.

Upon an objection being made, defendant argued that
the question called for an admission of what plaintiff heard
while present at the divorce trial (160) and a declaration
against interest (162). The court sustained the objection,
pointing out that the "declaration" was not by plaintiff but ·
by some other person and that it was hearsay and that
such testimony of the wife would have to be proved by the
witness so that she could be cross examined (162). Counsel for defendant then specifically stated that his offer was
not to put plaintiff's wife on the stand, but to read her testimony in the divorce action (167). He then proceeded
to offer to prove the following statements made by plaintiff's wife in the divorce proceeding (p. 29 of the transcript
of the divorce proceeding----presumably the testimony
proceeded on the days of October 24th, 25th or 26th, 1951).
"Well, the trouble at that time was that his aunt was
living with us. She was not well. I wasn't particularly
well. I had two very small children, I believe Dale at
that time was on the road. I just can't remember.
Anyway, I was alone a great deal of the time with his
aunt, and she was ill, nervously ill that is. And I could
not continued waiting on her, waiting on the children
. . . ."
(and so on, over her interpretation of some of the early
married life of the parties.)
The plaintiff's objection that the offer was "incompetent, immaterial, as hearsay, as contrary to the statute and
in violation of the statute and in violation of the privilege
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o~ the former husband

.
., was sustained by the
court on the ground that it was hearsay.
Counsel then offered numerous excerpts from Geraldine Wilson's testimony from the transcript in the divorce
case, assuming to narrate, argue and detail communications
and troubles between the parties during their married life
prior to the ~claimed alienation of her affection, and indicated he wished. to read such ex·cerpts in the presence of
the jury and to ask if plaintiff at the divorce trial did not
hear his wife so testify (171-183).
Appellant argues that "the testimony was not offered
for the purpose of establishing the facts testified to, but
for· the purpose of showing that plaintiff had heard from
his wife's own lips statements discrediting his claim that
they were happy." There was no issue in the alienation
suit as to whether, following the claimed alienation, plaintiff had heard his wife testify in a divorce trial. If evidence
in another case, not involving the same parties, could be
narrated before the· jury under such guise, there would be
no limit to getting improper matters before the jury under
the guise of cross examination. Of course, at the time of divorce trial, when the alienation was complete,, Mrs. Wilson
was unfriendly toward the plaintiff, undoubtedly as a result
of the very alienation of which complaint is made. Her narrations and arguments then were not rendered competent
because plaintiff heard them any more than was incompetent testi·mony at the instant trial rendered competent by
plaintiff's being present in ~court.
Declarations of the spouse showing want of conjugal
affection are not to be admitted unless it affirmatively appears that they were made before the spouse was the subject of intrigue with, or under the influence of, the defend-
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ant in whose behalf they are sought to be introduced. Johnson v. Richards (Idaho) 294 Pac. 507. After this has occurred, _they are inadmissible as hearsay. Brison v. McKellop (Okla)- 138 Pac. 154. Mumper v.Webster (Ore) 3 P.2d
753.
Most of ~e excerpts from the divorce transcript were
mere narration and conclusions concerning the claimed relations of the parties given at the divorce trial. All related
to periods prior to the claimed alienation of affection. All
were from testimony given after the .claimed alienation was
completed. Most of them would not have been admissible
if offered to be proved by the witness in person, and none
of them would have been admissible- even though they were
included in a deposition in the alienatio~ of affection suit
itself, since the witness was not a party and she was present in oourt and available to testify in person. Utah Rules·
of Civil Procedure 26 (d) (3). Moreover, except for mere
arguments and conclusions in that transcript, when Mr~~·.
Wilson was actually called personally she testified to practically all the facts covered in the proffered excerpts from
the divorce transcript anyway. Under such circumstances,
the rulings of the court were proper on several different ·
grounds, and were the only conceivable rulings that could
have been made under the circumstances. They could not
be_ ~eemed ·prejudicial in any event.

:1

CONCLUSION
What was said by the Colorado court in concluding its·
opinion affinning the lower ·court in Suppersteiri v. Woods,
40 P.2d 622, seems pertinent by way of ·summary here:
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"We have given this record diligent investigation. The
case of the defendant was well presented and tried :})e.
low, ~as it has been upon this review, by able and ingenious counseL The jury evidently disbelieved the
testimony of the de·fendant himself. In the very nature
of thing·s, in cases like the one before us, direct and
positive evidence of the witnesses, aside from the testimony of the parties themselves, would ·be difficult to
obtain .. If the jury believed the testimony of the plaintiff, and it evidently did, and we see nothing unreasonable in it, the verdict was a righteous one, and the trial
court approved of the jury's findings and entered judgment accordingly.''
The case at bar was tried before a jury concerning
which there is no showing of any bias or prejudice. It was
tried before an able judge whose careful, fair and patient rulings, sometimes in the face of the most unreasonable and
protracted insistence upon clearly incompetent testimony by
defendant, belie the defendant's attacks upon him. The
facts and law fully justified and required a verdict in favor
of the plai·ntiff.
Any other conclusion, or any reduction of the verdict,
would be an undue depreciation of the value of conjugal
rights and of the mental pain, suffering and humiliation
attendant upon their ruthless, persistent and studied violation; \YOUld be an unjustified acceptance of a pattern expounded by the defendant which would strike deep at the
very institution of marriage. The complaint stated a cause
of action and the court did not err in overruling defendant's
motions attacking the complaint. The verdict is not ex-cessive in view of the unprecedented combination of circumstances as shown hy the record in this case, and there is no
indication that it was the result of any passion or prejudice.
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The only complaints the defendant can ~make with basis in
the reco~d are that the jury did not believe all of his testimony and did not adopt 'his theory of the evidence and that

they placed a higher value on plaintiff's marriage than he,
the defendant, did.
The evidence was abundant to support the verdict and
the court did not err in refusing to grant defendant's m<>
tions for a directed verdict or for a new trial. The evidence
of malice, wilfulnes and wantonness of the defendant went
beyond what the law required as a foundation for ptmitive
damages. Evidence as to defendant's wealth was properly
received to assist the jury in determining what ~would be an
appropriate amount for punitive damages. The court did
not eiT in instructing the jury, nor did it err in ruling on
the admissibility of the evidence.
No prejudicial error appears in the record.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed,
with costs to the plaintiff and respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON
PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSON
CHRISTENSON & CHRllSTENSON

Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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